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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the asymptotics of two multi-user channel problems.
The fingerprinting channel is associated with digital fingerprinting, which is
an emerging technology to protect multimedia from unauthorized redistri-
bution. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides
the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the collud-
ers. The multiple access channel (MAC) is a classical problem in the field of
network information theory. Multiple senders cooperate with one another to
maximize their rates of communication to a single receiver. We address the
problem of asymptotic analysis when the size of the problem goes to infinity.
The fundamental metric of measuring the detection capability of a finger-
printing system is capacity. It has recently been derived as the limit value of
a sequence of maximin games with mutual information as their payoff func-
tions. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions
and are very hard to solve. Here under a modified version of the combined
digit model proposed by Sˇkoric´ et al., we reformulate the capacity as the
value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by
a saddle-point solution.
For fingerprinting capacity games with k pirates, we provide capacities
along with optimal strategies for both players of the game when k is small.
For large k, we show that capacity is asymptotic to A/k2 where the con-
stant A is specified as the maximin value of a continuous functional game.
Saddle-point solutions to the game are obtained using methods of variational
calculus.
For multiple access channels we study the maximum achievable rate re-
gion for a given blocklength n and a desired error probability . The inner
region for the discrete memoryless MAC is approximated by a single-lettered
expression I− 1√
n
Qinv(V, ) where I is associated with the capacity pentagon
bounds by Ahlswede and Liao, V is the MAC dispersion matrix, and Qinv is
ii
the inverse complementary multivariate Gaussian cumulative distribution re-
gion. For outer regions, we provide general converse bounds for both average
error probability and maximal error probability criteria.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The domain of network information theory studies the communication prob-
lem where multiple senders and receivers transmit signals in a system. The
interactions among users in the system include interference, cooperation,
feedback, etc. The general problem of what the fundamental limits of such
transmission are has not yet been solved and it is one of the most active areas
of research in the past decade in information theory. In this dissertation we
consider the following two special problems:
1. Digital Fingerprinting: Distributors of digital contents (e.g. im-
ages, videos, audios, programs, etc.) embed a uniquely identified fin-
gerprint into each distributed copy. Upon receiving a forgery generated
by a coalition of users combining their copies, a fingerprint decoder ana-
lyzes traces of fingerprint left in the forgery and identifies the coalition.
2. Multiple Access Channel: This is a common model of multiple
senders sending information to a single receiver. Examples include
ground stations transmitting signals to a satellite receiver or cell phones
communicating with a base station. The receiver decodes the received
signal to messages from each sender.
Despite the apparent differences between the two problems, the digital
fingerprinting channel is indeed a special case of the multiple access channel:
the users in the coalition are the multiple senders, the fingerprint decoder
is the single receiver, and the individual identities of the coalition are the
message the decoder tries to decipher. The main difference between the two
problems is that while in the general setup of multiple access channels the
senders try to maximize the communication rates to the receiver, the senders
(i.e. the coalition of users) in a fingerprinting system try to minimize the
communication rates to the receiver to avoid detection.
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We also focus on different senses of asymptotics for the two problems we
study. For the digital fingerprinting problem, the major challenges are the
uncertainty of the collusion channel, especially when the coalition size k is
large. Therefore the asymptotic analysis focuses on characterizing finger-
printing capacity when k goes to infinity. For the multiple access channel
problem, we assume the channel is known and the number of senders is fixed,
and we attack the problem of characterizing the coding rate region as the
blocklength n goes to infinity. In the rest of the chapter, we briefly review
both problems and provide an outline of this dissertation.
1.1 Focus and Perspective
1.1.1 Fingerprinting Capacity
Before distribution of a copyrighted content, a fingerprinting system embeds
a unique identification fingerprint into each copy, which can be extracted
and helps trace unauthorized redistribution. A collusion attack is a powerful
attack by a group of malicious users called pirates who combine their copies to
generate a new version that contains only weak traces of their fingerprints.
The goal of a fingerprinting decoder is to identify the pirates even under
severe collusion attacks.
The challenges of designing an effective fingerprinting system are many-
fold. Firstly, it is difficult to construct a suitable model that describes the
colluders’ activities for different applications. Secondly, theoretical studies
have shown that in some models, the maximum achievable rate, or capac-
ity, decays quadratically with the size of the coalition k [1]. Thirdly, recent
constructions on capacity-achieving fingerprinting codes require exponential
computational complexity [2, 3] while efficient designs fall short in achieving
capacity [4, 3].
The Boneh-Shaw marking assumption [5] is one of the most popular fin-
gerprinting models in the literature. It assumes that pirates can only “cut-
and-paste” their copies. This assumption, however, omits the possibility of
pirates performing signal processing attacks which occasionally remove or
replace a fingerprint symbol. The combined digit model (CDM) recently pro-
posed by Sˇkoric´ et al. [6] is a significant generalization of the Boneh-Shaw
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marking assumption which successfully accounts for both types of attack. In
attempting to bring the theory of fingerprinting one step closer to practical
scenarios, we study fingerprinting capacity games under CDM in this work.
We show that fingerprinting capacity is the value of a two-person zero-
sum game which admits a saddle-point solution. In the binary alphabet case
under the marking assumption, new capacity bounds are provided in closed-
form expressions. The ratio between the upper and lower bounds of the joint
decoding scheme is pi2/2, while that of the simple decoding scheme is only
pi2/4 (for large k). These bounds not only show that the binary fingerprinting
capacity is in Θ(1/k2), but they also provide secure strategies for both players
of the game. Numerical solutions for small k are also presented in comparison
with the bounds.
In Chap. 5 we show that the pirates can perform a stronger attack under
CDM and capacity under CDM is about 20-30% less than that under the
marking assumption. This suggests that the marking assumption is indeed
too optimistic in addressing the colluders’ capability of manipulating their
fingerprint copies. The results also shed light on the structure of capacity-
achieving codes, and on how the colluders can maximally utilize their copies
to avoid detection. We then analyze the asymptotics of the game when
the coalition size k is large, generalizing the asymptotic results for binary
alphabets under the marking assumption [7]. Assuming a certain regularity
condition, we show that capacity for q-ary alphabet against size-k coalition
still decays quadratically with k under CDM and the constant in front is
the value of a q-dimensional continuous-kernel game. Using the methods of
variational calculus, a set of Euler-Lagrange differential equations, Lagrange
multipliers, and boundary conditions can be explicitly specified as necessary
and sufficient conditions. We derive the following results:
1. Binary alphabet with marking assumption: The asymptotic capacity
is (k22 ln 2)−1, the optimal embedding distribution is the arcsine distri-
bution, and the optimal attack is the interleaving attack.
2. Binary alphabet with CDM: The asymptotic capacity is strictly smaller
than (k22 ln 2)−1 and the gap depends on the parameters of CDM.
Somewhat surprisingly the optimal embedding is still the arcsine dis-
tribution, but the optimal attack is no longer the interleaving attack.
3
3. Arbitrary alphabet with marking assumption: The asymptotic capac-
ity is (q − 1)/(2k2 ln q), the optimal embedding distribution belongs
to the family of Dirichlet distributions, and the optimal attack is the
interleaving attack.
1.1.2 Multiple Access Channel
Shannon’s single-user channel coding problem and other classical channel
problems give us an elegant formulation of capacities or capacity regions.
The theorems state that the maximum rate of transmission approaches ca-
pacity or capacity region as the blocklength tends to infinity. However, such
theorems do not provide convergence rates. This issue is addressed by asymp-
totic channel coding analysis conducted by Strassen [8] and others in the early
1960s and recently revisited by Polyanskiy et al. [9] and Hayashi [10]. Ex-
tension of the techniques therein to multiuser settings is quite challenging
[11, 12, 7, 13, 14].
In this work, we study the second-order coding rates for MAC. The char-
acterization of the average error capacity region of the discrete memoryless
MAC (DM-MAC) is given independently by Ahlswede [15] and Liao [16]. Un-
like the single-user channel, the maximal error capacity region is generally
smaller than the average error capacity region [17] and its characterization
remains an open problem. The strong converse results in [18, 19] further
strengthened the notion of capacity region in the sense that no rate pairs
outside the capacity region can be -achievable for any  < 1. Recent devel-
opment of this line of work includes Tan and Kosut’s [11], MolavianJazi and
Laneman’s [12], Scarlett et al.’s [20], and our [7] analyses on the finite block-
length capacity inner region for DM-MAC, MolavianJazi and Laneman’s [13]
further extension of their results to Gaussian MAC, and Verdu´’s [14] and our
[7] general converses.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
The outline of this dissertation is as follows: In Chap. 2, we introduce
our fingerprinting model and formally defined fingerprinting capacity. The
capacity formulas derived in [3] are reviewed and reformulated in Chap. 3.
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Chap. 4 and Chap. 5 are devoted to the binary alphabet case and the
arbitrary alphabet case, respectively. The multiple access channel problem
is studied in Chap. 6, and a brief summary is provided in Chap. 7.
1.3 Notation
We use capital letters to represent random variables, and lowercase letters
to represent their realizations. Boldface denotes vectors, and calligraphic
letters denote finite sets. For example, X ∈ X n denotes a random vector
(X1, . . . , Xn), with each Xi taking values in X . The probability distribu-
tion of X is characterized by its distribution function PX(x) , Pr(X1 ≤
x1, . . . , Xn ≤ xn). If the distribution is discrete, we also describe it by its
probability mass function (pmf) pX(x) , Pr(X = x). Otherwise if PX has
the form
PX(x) =
∫ x1
−∞
· · ·
∫ xn
−∞
fX(x)dx1 . . . dxn
then we characterize the distribution by its probability density function (pdf)
fX. Mathematical expectation of a function g(X) with respect to PX is
defined by
EPX [(g(X)] ,
∫
g(x)dP (x).
The mutual information of X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ) = H(X) −
H(X|Y ). Should the dependency on the underlying pmf’s be explicit, we
write the pmf’s as subscripts, e.g. HpX (X) and IpXpY |X (X;Y ). Given a
pair of sequences (x,y), we denote by I(x; y) the empirical mutual infor-
mation of the joint pmf pxy. We also denote the binary entropy function
by hq(p) = −p logq p − (1 − p) logq(1 − p) and h(p) = (h(p1), . . . , h(pn))′.
The base-q Kullback-Leibler divergence between two probability vectors p
and q is denoted by Dq(p ‖ q), and the base-2 Kullback-Leibler divergence
between two Bernoulli random variables with respective expectations p and
q is denoted by d2(p‖q) , p log2 pq + (1− p) log2 1−p1−q , where logq denotes base
q logarithm and ln denotes natural logarithm throughout the dissertation.
Sequences are denoted by 〈·〉. The size or cardinality of a finite set A is
denoted by |A|. The indicator function of a subset A of a set X is a function
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1A : X → {0, 1} defined as
1A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 if x /∈ A .
The power set of a finite set X , denoted by 2X , is the set of all subsets of
X , including the empty set and X itself. The support of a probability dis-
tribution P , denoted by supp(P ), is the smallest set whose complement has
probability zero. The support of a family P of probability distributions, de-
noted by supp(P), is the union of the support of each probability distribution
in the family, i.e.,
⋃
P∈P supp(P ).
Asymptotic notations are defined as follows: Suppose f(k) and g(k) are
two functions defined on positive real numbers. We say f(k) = O(g(k)) if
∃c1 > 0, k1 > 0 such that f(k) ≤ c1g(k),∀k ≥ k1. Also, f(k) = Ω(g(k))
if ∃c2 > 0, k2 > 0 such that f(k) ≥ c2g(k),∀k ≥ k2. We write f(k) =
Θ(g(k)) if f(k) = O(g(k)) and f(k) = Ω(g(k)). The expression f(k) =
o(g(k)) or f(k) = ω(g(k)) means that f(k)/g(k) tends to 0 or∞ respectively.
The shorthand f ∼ g, f & g, and f . g denote the asymptotic relations
limk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
= 1, lim infk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
≥ 1, and lim supk→∞ f(k)g(k) ≤ 1 respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES ON FINGERPRINTING
2.1 Fingerprinting System
Let X = Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} denote a size-q alphabet, M = {1, . . . ,M}
the user index set, and Wn a set of secret key values. An (n,M) random-
ized fingerprinting code C over X , or fingerprinting ensemble, consists of an
encoder-decoder pair (en, dn). The encoder
en :M×Wn → X n
assigns user m a length-n fingerprint Xm = en(m,Wn) where Wn is the
random key. The mapping en is known to the public but the realization of
Wn is kept secret from the pirates.
A coalition is formed by a subset of k users who are also called collud-
ers. Without loss of generality, we denote the set of colluder indices by K =
{1, . . . , k}. The colluders observe fingerprint sequences XK = {X1, . . . ,Xk}
and use them to produce a forgery Y ∈ Yn. The process is modeled by pass-
ing XK through a collusion channel pY|XK , which is a conditional probability
distribution on Y given XK.
Based upon the received forgery Y and the secret key Wn, the decoder
dn : Yn ×Wn → 2M, Kˆ = dn(Y,Wn)
accuses a subset of users Kˆ. Two error criteria are often used: Under the
detect-all criterion an error occurs when Kˆ is not equal to K, and under
the detect-one criterion an error occurs when Kˆ is empty or contains some
innocent user m /∈ K. Our complete model for the fingerprinting system is
shown in Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Fingerprinting system model
2.2 Randomized Fingerprinting Codes
The formal definition of an ensemble of fingerprinting codes is as follows.
Definition 2.1. A fingerprinting ensemble (En, Dn) is formed by the finger-
printing embedder randomly choosing from a family {en(·, wn), dn(·, wn), wn ∈
Wn} of (n,M) fingerprinting codes according to some probability distribution
on the set Wn of keys.
We assume that the family of fingerprinting codes and the probability
distribution on Wn are known to the public, but the realization wn is only
known to the encoder and the decoder.
As shown in [3], it suffices to consider the following two-phase fingerprint-
ing construction and joint/simple decoding scheme in studying capacity. The
secret key Wn shared by the encoder and the decoder in this scheme is the
set of random variables {Wi}ni=1 ∪ (Xm,i)M×n.
2.2.1 Encoding Scheme
Let PW be a probability distribution on the (q − 1)-dimensional simplex
W , {w ∈ Rq : ‖w‖1 = 1,w ≥ 0}. A sequence of auxiliary “time-sharing”
random variables {Wi}ni=1 is drawn independent and identically from the
distribution PW. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, {Xi,j}mi=1 are m independent and
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identically distributed random variables constructed from a categorical dis-
tribution1 with parameter Wi, i.e.,
Pr (X1,i = x1, . . . , XM,i = xM |Wi = w) =
M∏
m=1
wxm (2.1)
for x1, . . . , xm ∈ X . In general, there is no constraint on the choice of the
embedding distribution PW, which means that we can choose it from the
class of all probability distributions onW , denoted by PW. However, we may
want to limit PW to a subclass Pe of PW in some applications. For instance,
Nuida et al. [21] limited PW to be discrete with a finite spectrum. Furon
and Perez-Freire [22] studied the case when PW is the arcsine distribution
(defined in (4.3) or the uniform distribution over the unit interval for binary
fingerprinting codes, in which Pe is just a singleton.
In most of our results we require Pe to be compact. In some results we also
require the following condition. Note that Pe satisfying (2.2) is compact.
Condition 2.2. Pe coincides with the class of all probability distributions
on supp(Pe), i.e.,
Pe = {PW ∈ PW : supp(PW) ⊆ supp(Pe)} . (2.2)
Analogous to the symbol-symmetric fingerprinting codes proposed by Sˇkoric´
et al. [23], it is intuitively reasonable to adopt a probability distribution PW
that is invariant to permutations of the symbols. Formally, let pi be a per-
mutation of X and define
P piW(w0, . . . , wq−1) , PW(wpi(0), . . . , wpi(q−1)). (2.3)
Then we have
Definition 2.3. An embedding distribution PW is symbol-symmetric if
P piW = PW, ∀pi. (2.4)
1The categorical distribution is a special case of the multinomial distribution with the
number of trials set to 1.
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Definition 2.4. A subset Pe of PW is said to be symbol-symmetric if
PW ∈ Pe ⇒ P piW ∈ Pe, ∀pi. (2.5)
Definition 2.5. The symbol-symmetric subclass of an embedding class Pe is
defined by
Pesym = {PW ∈ Pe : PW is symbol-symmetric} . (2.6)
The optimality of limiting PW to Pesym will be discussed in the next section.
2.2.2 Decoding Scheme
We briefly review Moulin’s two decoding schemes proposed in [3]: the simple
decoder tests candidate fingerprints one by one, while the joint decoder uti-
lizes a joint decoding rule. The simple decoder evaluates the empirical mutual
information I(xm; y|w) for each user m. A threshold ηsimple is chosen and
user m is accused if and only if I(xm; y|w) > ηsimple. If I(xm; y|w) ≤ ηsimple
for all m ∈ M, then Kˆ = ∅. The joint decoder evaluates the following score
for each coalition A ⊆M:
S(A) =
{
0, if A = ∅
I(xA; y|w)− |A|ηjoint, otherwise
(2.7)
where ηjoint is a threshold. The set A that has the largest score is then
accused. With the parameters ηsimple and ηjoint, both decoders allow to tune
the trade-offs between false positive and false negative error probabilities.
It is shown in [3] that the joint decoding scheme achieves capacity while the
simple decoding scheme has a smaller maximum achievable rate. However,
the computational complexity of a joint decoder is generally vastly greater
than that of a simple decoder.
2.3 Collusion Channel
The set of admissible collusion channels determines the coalition’s capability
of manipulating the fingerprint sequences available to them. The Boneh-
Shaw marking assumption and its nonbinary alphabet variants [5, 23] are the
10
most commonly adopted model in the literature. However, these models fail
to completely capture plausible colluders’ actions. Sˇkoric´ et al. [6] recently
proposed a more general setup called the combined digit model. However,
CDM combines the collusion and the decoding process and is very hard to
analyze. Here we introduce a modified version of CDM which is tractable
and retains the spirit of the original model. We show how all variants of
the marking assumption fit into our new model and how parameters can be
determined based on applications.
We first introduce a number of properties of collusion channels. We con-
sider a memoryless collusion channel pY|XK , i.e.,
pY|XK(y|xK) =
n∏
i=1
pY |XK(yi|xK,i),
which implies that for each coordinate i the forgery symbol yi depends only
on x1,i, . . . , xk,i. As exploited in [3], the memoryless restriction can be re-
laxed without changing the fingerprinting capacity. For simplicity we impose
this constraint so the colluders’ strategy can be characterized by the single-
lettered channel pY |XK and we will drop the coordinate index i in the following
analysis.
Given a single-lettered collusion channel pY |XK , consider the user-permuted
collusion channel
pY |Xpi(K)(y|x1, . . . , xk) , pY |XK(y|xpi(1), . . . , xpi(k)) (2.8)
where pi is a permutation of K. We say that pY |XK is user-symmetric if
pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀pi. (2.9)
A class Pc of collusion channels is said to be user-symmetric if
pY |XK ∈ Pc ⇒ pY |Xpi(K) ∈ Pc, ∀pi. (2.10)
Note that in general not all elements of such Pc are user-symmetric.
The user-symmetric subclass of a collusion class Pc that consists of user-
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symmetric collusion channels is defined by
Pcfair = {pY |XK ∈ Pc : pY |XK is user-symmetric}. (2.11)
Symbol-symmetry can also be defined for collusion channels. Let pi be a
permutation of X and define
ppiY |XK(y|x1, . . . , xk) , pY |XK(pi(y)|pi(x1), . . . , pi(xk)). (2.12)
Then we have
Definition 2.6. A collusion channel pY |XK is symbol-symmetric if
ppiY |XK = pY |XK , ∀pi. (2.13)
Definition 2.7. A class Pc of collusion channels is said to be symbol-
symmetric if
pY |XK ∈ Pc ⇒ ppiY |XK ∈ Pc, ∀pi. (2.14)
Definition 2.8. The symbol-symmetric subclass of a collusion class Pc is
defined by
Pcsym =
{
pY |XK ∈ Pc : pY |XK is symbol-symmetric
}
. (2.15)
With the assumption of a memoryless collusion channel and user-symmetry2,
we let Z = [Z0, Z1, . . . , Zq−1]′ ∈ {0, . . . , k}q with
Zx =
k∑
m=1
δXmx, x ∈ X
which indicates how many times the k colluders see symbol x at a given
coordinate. Let Z , {z ∈ {0, . . . , k}q : ∑q−1x=0 zx = k}. We let Y = Q ∪ {e}
where ‘e’ denotes an erasure. Based on the user-symmetry assumption, Z
is a sufficient statistic for generating Y , and the colluders’ strategy can be
modeled by the (q + 1)× |Z| matrix Θ , {θ(z)}z∈Z where
θy(z) , pY |Z(y|z), y ∈ Y , z ∈ Z (2.16)
2We do not need to impose symbol-symmetry in our definition of collusion channels
here.
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is the conditional probability of selecting forgery symbol y given the count
vector z. Our modified CDM admits two parameter vectors: rc = [rc,1, . . . , rc,q−1]′
and re = [re,1, . . . , re,q]
′. The value rc,N specifies an upper bound on the prob-
ability of pirates generating an unseen symbol given they have seen N dis-
tinct symbols, and the value re,N specifies an upper bound on the probability
of pirates generating the erasure given they have seen N distinct symbols.
Mathematically, a collusion channel Θ is admissible if and only if it satisfies
the linear constraints ∑
y∈Q,y /∈XK
θy(z) ≤ rc,N(z) (2.17a)
θe(z) ≤ re,N(z) (2.17b)
for z ∈ Z where N(z) ≤ k denotes the number of distinct symbols seen by
the pirates.
This is indeed a fairly general model as it reduces to the following four
variants of the marking assumption in the literature with different choices of
rc and re:
• Restricted digit model (RDM): RDM only allows the colluders to
“mix and match” their copies of the content, i.e., Y can only be one of
the symbols in XK.
• Unreadable digit model (UDM): UDM allows slightly stronger at-
tacks. Besides the symbols they have, the colluders can also generate
an erasure when N(z) > 1.
• Arbitrary digit model (ADM): ADM does not allow erasures, but
Y can be any symbol in Q when N(z) > 1. In Sec. 5.1 we show that
ADM allows stronger attacks than UDM.
• General digit model (GDM): GDM allows Y to be any symbol in
Q or an erasure when N(z) > 1. This allows the strongest attacks.
Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters corresponding to different models. It
also shows realistic values of parameters based on simulations in [6]. Collusion
classes are denoted by PRDM, PUDM, etc. for specific models or Pc in general.
Collusion channels in our following analysis are represented by the (q+1)× t
matrix Θ , [θ(z1), · · · ,θ(zt)].
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Table 2.1: CDM Parameters for Variants of the Marking Assumption
Model
Forgery Parameters
alphabet r′c r
′
e
RDM Q [0, 0, · · · , 0] [0, 0, · · · , 0]
UDM Q∪ {e} [0, 0, · · · , 0] [0, 1, · · · , 1]
ADM Q [0, 1, · · · , 1] [0, 0, · · · , 0]
GDM Q∪ {e} [0, 1, · · · , 1] [0, 1, · · · , 1]
CDM1
Q∪ {e}
[.01, .01, · · · , .01] [.20, .65, .84, .92, .92, · · · ]
CDM2 [.05, .05, · · · , .05] [.06, .40, .57, .72, .75, · · · ]
CDM3 [.10, .10, · · · , .10] [.03, .25, .44, .54, .63, · · · ]
Note: our CDM is not the same as the original definition in [6], but one
can still see the tradeoff between rc and re
2.4 Error Probabilities and Capacity
Under fingerprinting ensemble (En, Dn), coalition size k , and collusion chan-
nel pY |XK , we consider the following error probabilities:
• The probability of false positives (accusing an innocent user):
PFPe (En, Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
Kˆ \ K 6= ∅
)
. (2.18)
• The probability of failing to catch any single pirate:
P onee (En, Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
Kˆ ∩ K = ∅
)
. (2.19)
• The probability of failing to catch the full coalition:
P alle (En, Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
K * Kˆ
)
. (2.20)
The error probabilities above can be written explicitly as
Pe(En, Dn, pY |XK) =
∑
en,dn
Pr(en, dn)
∑
xM,y
n∏
i=1
∫
dPW(wi)
(
M∏
m=1
wxm,i
)
pY |XK(yi|xK,i)1E (2.21)
where the error event E is given by EFP = {dn(y, wn) \ K 6= ∅}, Eone =
{dn(y, wn) ∩ K = ∅}, and Eall = {K * dn(y, wn)}, when Pe is given by (2.18),
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(2.19), and (2.20) respectively. The worst-case error probability for a collu-
sion class is given by
Pe,k(En, Dn,Pc) = maxK⊆M
|K|≤k
max
pY |XK∈Pc
Pe
(
En, Dn, pY |XK
)
. (2.22)
Having defined the error probabilities of the randomized fingerprinting
scheme, we now define the notion of capacity.
Definition 2.9. A rate R is achievable for embedding class Pe, collusion
channel Pc, and size-k coalitions under the detect-one criterion if there
exists a sequence of fingerprinting ensembles (En, Dn) generated by PW ∈ Pe
for M = d2nRe users such that both PFPe,k (En, Dn,Pc) and P onee,k (En, Dn,Pc)
vanish as n tends to infinity.
Definition 2.10. A rate R is achievable for embedding class Pe, collusion
channel Pc, and size-k coalitions under the detect-all criterion if there exists
a sequence of fingerprinting ensembles (En, Dn) generated by PW ∈ Pe for
M = d2nRe users such that both PFPe,k (En, Dn,Pc) and P alle,k(En, Dn,Pc) vanish
as n goes to infinity.
Definition 2.11. Fingerprinting capacities Conek,q (Pe,Pc) and Callk,q(Pe,Pc)
are the suprema of all achievable rates with respect to the detect-one and
detect-all criteria, respectively.
Remark 2.1. When the embedding class Pe is a singleton {PW} or the
collusion class Pc is a singleton {pY |XK}, we denote the corresponding capac-
ities as Ck,q(PW, ·) and Ck,q(·, pY |XK) respectively, which is a slight abuse of
notation.
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CHAPTER 3
MUTUAL INFORMATION GAMES OF
FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY
In this chapter we first review the mutual information games associated with
both the joint and the simple decoding schemes in [3]. We show how these
games can be simplified under the combined digit model, and we show the
existence of saddle-point solutions.
3.1 Mutual Information Game for Joint Decoder
To present the capacity formula, we first introduce the following setup: for
a fixed embedding class Pe, let
Pel , {pW ∈ Pe : |supp(pW)| ≤ l} (3.1)
be the class of probability distributions with finite spectrum composed of
no more than l points of the (q − 1)-dimensional simplex W . A random
variable W is drawn from some pW ∈ Pel , and {Xm}km=1 are independent
and identically distributed with categorical distribution with parameter W,
i.e.,
pXK|W(xK|w) =
k∏
m=1
pX|W(xm|w) (3.2)
where
pX|W(x|w) = wx, x ∈ X .
The collusion class Pc is the set of all feasible channels pY |XK . Let
C joint,lk,q (Pe,Pc) = max
pW∈Pel
min
pY |XK∈Pc
1
k
I(XK;Y |W). (3.3)
The following theorem summarizes the main results of fingerprinting capacity
proposed in [3] under the marking assumption.
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Theorem 3.1. Assume that Condition 2.2 is satisfied and Pc is compact.
Then
1. The detect-all capacity is upper bounded by the detect-one capacity, i.e.,
Callk,q(Pe,Pc) ≤ Conek,q (Pe,Pc).
2. Suppose further that Pc is user-symmetric, then
Conek,q (Pe,Pc) = Conek,q (Pe,Pcfair) = Callk,q(Pe,Pcfair) = lim
l→∞
C joint,lk,q (Pe,Pc).
(3.4)
3. All rates below Conek,q (Pe,Pc) are achievable by the joint decoding scheme
in Sec. 2.2.2.
Theorem 3.1 states that the detect-all capacity can never exceed the detect-
one capacity, which is no surprise since it can only be harder for the decoder
to detect all the pirates than to detect only one of the pirates. However, if
the collusion channel is user-symmetric, which we can intuitively think of as
the case when each colluder “contributes” the same number of samples to
the forgery (hence the term “fair”), then the detect-one and the detect-all
capacities are the same.
To distinguish capacity from the highest achievable rate achievable by the
simple decoding scheme (discussed in the next section), we will in the rest
of the dissertation refer to the detect-one capacity Conek,q (Pe,Pc), denoted by
C jointk,q (Pe,Pc), as the joint fingerprinting capacity for embedding class Pe and
collusion channel Pc.
In the game-theoretic point of view, C joint,lk,q is the maximin value of a two-
person zero-sum game for each l. Observe that the sequence 〈C joint,lk,q 〉∞l=1 is
nondecreasing since 〈Pel 〉∞l=1 is nondecreasing (i.e. Pe1 ⊆ Pe2 ⊆ · · · ). Thus
the game can be interpreted as the following: the maximizer, the fingerprint
embedder, picks pW with an increasing flexibility in the support size, while
the minimizer, the coalition, counters the embedder’s choice for each l by
minimizing the mutual information payoff function. Fingerprinting capacity
is the limit value of the sequence of maximin games.
However, the maximin game of (3.3) is in general very difficult to solve
even for small values of l since a saddle-point solution cannot be guaranteed.
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For the binary alphabet (q = 2) and l = 1 under RDM, we can derive the
maximin value as
C joint,1k (PW,PRDM) =
1
k
2−(k−1) (3.5)
which is not achieved by a saddle-point solution when k > 2. Also, this is
a very loose lower bound on C jointk,q (PW,PRDM) for large k comparing to the
Θ(k−2) bound we will show in Sec. 4.3.
3.2 Mutual Information Game for Simple Decoder
As mentioned in Sec. 2.2, computationally joint decoding is too complex.
Thus it is also interesting to study the maximum achievable rate of the simple
decoding scheme.
Theorem 3.2. [3] Assume that Condition 2.2 is satisfied and Pc is compact
and user-symmetric. Let
Csimple,lk,q (Pe,Pc) = max
pW∈Pel
min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
I(X1;Y |W) (3.6)
for l ≥ 1 and let
Csimplek,q (Pe,Pc) = lim
l→∞
Csimple,lk,q (Pe,Pc). (3.7)
Then all rates below Csimplek,q (Pe,Pc) are achievable by the simple decoding
scheme for embedding class Pe, collusion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions
under the detect-one criterion.
Corollary 3.3. [3] For Pe satisfying Condition 2.2 and compact and user-
symmetric Pc, we have
Csimplek,q (Pe,Pc) ≤ C jointk,q (Pe,Pc). (3.8)
Although we do not have a notion of capacity for the quantity Csimplek,q , it
will be referred to as the “simple” fingerprinting capacity as opposed to the
joint fingerprinting discussed in the previous subsection.
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3.3 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games of Fingerprinting
Capacity
To establish the desired saddle-point property, we first reformulate both the
joint and the simple fingerprinting capacities as the respective values of the
following two fingerprinting maximin games.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that Condition 2.2 is satisfied and Pc is compact
and user-symmetric. Then
C jointk,q (Pe,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |XK∈Pc
1
k
I(XK;Y |W) (3.9)
and
Csimplek,q (Pe,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
I(X1;Y |W). (3.10)
Proof. Let
I jointk,q (w, pY |XK) =
1
k
IpY |XK (XK;Y |W = w) (3.11)
and let
Isimplek,q (w, pY |XK) = IpY |XK (X1;Y |W = w). (3.12)
Then the payoff functions of (3.9) and (3.10) become EPW
[
I jointk (W, pY |XK)
]
and EPW
[
Isimplek,q (W, pY |XK)
]
respectively. Denote also the right-hand sides
of (3.9) and (3.10) by C˜ jointk,q (Pe,Pc) and C˜simplek,q (Pe,Pc) respectively. The
inequality
Ck,q(Pe,Pc) ≤ C˜k,q(Pe,Pc) (3.13)
follows directly from the fact that Pel ⊆ Pe for each l. Now let the optimal
achieving distributions for (3.9) or (3.10) be P
(k,q)
W and p
(k,q)
Y |XK . Then by
completeness of Pe, there exists a sequence of distributions 〈plW〉∞l=1 with
plW ∈ Pel that converges in distribution to P (k,q)W . Both the functions I jointk,q
and Isimplek,q are bounded and continuous with respect to w. By [24, p.249
Theorem 1] we have
lim
l→∞
EplW
[
Ik,q(W, p
(k,q)
Y |XK)
]
= E
P
(k,q)
W
[
Ik,q(W, p
(k,q)
Y |XK)
]
(3.14)
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and thus
Ck,q(Pe,Pc) ≥ lim
l→∞
EplW
[
Ik,q(W, p
(k,q)
Y |XK)
]
= C˜k,q(Pe,Pc). (3.15)
Combining (3.13) and (3.15) yields (3.9) and (3.10).
Theorem 3.4 shows that the joint and simple capacities are the maximin
values of two single two-person zero-sum games. Note that the theorem only
specifies the capacities when the embedding class Pe satisfies Condition 2.2.
With slight modification of the proofs in [3], it can be shown that (3.9) and
(3.10) still hold for any compact Pe. Furthermore, we can show that the
maximin and minimax values of the games are equal in general, and there
are always saddle-point strategies for both players of the games.
We define the minimax values associated with the above games:
Definition 3.1. The minimax value of the joint fingerprinting game is de-
fined by
C
joint
k,q (Pe,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pc
max
PW∈Pe
EPW
[
I jointk,q (W, pY |XK)
]
. (3.16)
Definition 3.2. The minimax value of the simple fingerprinting game is
defined by
C
simple
k,q (Pe,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
max
PW∈Pe
EPW
[
Isimplek,q (W, pY |XK)
]
. (3.17)
When Condition 2.2 is satisfied (for example, when Pe = PW), the mini-
max games can be simplified as the following:
Lemma 3.5. Assume that Condition 2.2 is satisfied. Then the minimax
values of the joint and simple fingerprinting games can be respectively written
as
C
joint
k,q (Pe,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pc
max
w∈supp(Pe)
I jointk,q (w, pY |XK) (3.18)
and
C
simple
k,q (Pe,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
max
w∈supp(Pe)
Isimplek,q (w, pY |XK). (3.19)
Proof. Note that randomization is no longer necessary for the minimax games
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of (3.16) and (3.17), so they have the same respective values as (3.18) and
(3.19).
We now present the main saddle-point property of the fingerprinting games.
The results owe to the convexity of the payoff function with respect to the
minimizer’s strategy. Such games are generally called convex games [25,
§2.5].
Theorem 3.6. For compact Pe, compact and user-symmetric Pc, and for
both the joint and simple games, Ck,q(Pe,Pc) = Ck,q(Pe,Pc). Suppose fur-
ther that Pe and Pc are symbol-symmetric, then the first argument Pe can
be replaced by Pesym and/or the second argument Pc can be replaced by Pcfair,
Pcsym, or Pcfair,sym without changing the minimax or the maximin value. For all
these games, the minimizer has an optimal strategy p
(k,q)
Y |XK ∈ Pcfair,sym while
the maximizer has an optimal strategy P
(k,q)
W ∈ Pesym. In particular, when
Condition 2.2 is satisfied, the maximizing strategy p
(k,q)
W ∈ Pesym has a finite
spectrum. The values of all these games equal the (joint or simple) finger-
printing capacity Ck,q(Pe,Pc).
Proof. We show that the functions I jointk,q and I
simple
k,q are convex functions of
pY |XK for fixed w. The convexity of I
joint
k,q is shown in [26, Theorem 2.7.4]. To
show the convexity of Isimplek,q (w, pY |XK), we fix w and consider two different
conditional distributions p1Y |XK and p
2
Y |XK . Note that
Isimplek,q (w, pY |XK) = I(X1;Y |W = w)
=
∑
x,y
pX1|W(x|w)pY |X1W(y|x,w) log
pY |X1W(y|x,w)
pY |W(y|w)
=
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)D(pY |X1W ‖ pY |W|W = w). (3.20)
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For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have
λIsimple(w, p1Y |XK) + (1− λ)Isimple(w, p2Y |XK)
=
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)
[
λD(p1Y |X1W ‖ p1Y |W|W = w)
+ (1− λ)D(p2Y |X1W ‖ p2Y |W|W = w)
]
≥
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)D(pλY |X1W ‖ pλY |W|W = w)
=Isimple(w, pλY |XK) (3.21)
where pλY |XK = λp
1
Y |XK + (1− λ)p2Y |XK ∈ Pc by compactness. The inequality
follows from the convexity of relative entropy [26, Theorem 2.7.2]. Hence
Isimplek,q is convex in pY |XK .
Now since Ik,q(w, pY |XK) is a convex function of pY |XK for fixed w ∈ Wq,
EPW [Ik,q(W, pY |XK)] is also a convex function of pY |XK for fixed PW ∈ PW.
On the other hand, EPW [Ik,q(W, pY |XK)] is a linear function of PW for fixed
pY |XK . By the minimax theorem [27], the game admits a saddle-point solu-
tion.
If Pe is symbol-symmetric and let PW be a minimizing saddle-point strat-
egy, then by symbol-symmetry each P piW ∈ Pe is a minimizing saddle-point
strategy for any permutation pi of X . The symbol-permutation averaged
distribution
PW =
1
q!
∑
pi
P piW (3.22)
is also a minimizing saddle-point strategy and is symbol-symmetric by con-
struction. Similarly if Pc is user-symmetric and symbol-symmetric, we can
construct a maximizing saddle-point strategy that is both user-symmetric
and symbol-symmetric.
Finally if Pe is the class of all probability distributions on supp(Pe) (Con-
dition 2.2), the game becomes a so-called convex game whose minimizing
strategy has a finite spectrum (see [25, §2.5]).
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CHAPTER 4
BINARY ALPHABET FINGERPRINTING
CAPACITY UNDER THE MARKING
ASSUMPTION
In this chapter we study intensively the joint and simple fingerprinting games
for the binary alphabet under the marking assumption. In this case the
four variations RDM, UDM, ADM, and GDM of the marking assumption
discussed in [23] are equivalent in terms of capacity. Hence for simplicity we
assume X = Y = {0, 1} and denote the collusion channel by PRDM. Tight
upper and lower bounds on capacities are provided under several different
setups.
4.1 Game Definition
The mutual information games for joint and simple decoder in the binary
case can be simplified as follows:
1. Fingerprinting Codes
The auxiliary random vector W now has only one degree of freedom,
and we redefine it as W = W1 ∈ [0, 1]. PW denotes its distribution and
pX|W ∼ Bernoulli(W ).
Suppose Pe is compact and symbol-symmetric. Then by Theorem 3.6,
it suffices to consider symbol-symmetric PW , which in the binary case
means that the distribution of W is symmetric about 1/2, i.e.,
Pr(W ≤ w) = Pr(W ≥ 1− w), w ∈ [0, 1]. (4.1)
In the numerical results in Sec. 4.5, we will consider a subset of the
family of beta distributions, which is a family of continuous probability
distributions defined on (0, 1):
dP βW (w) =
1
B(β, β)
[w(1− w)]β−1 (4.2)
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where the beta function, B(β, β) ,
∫ 1
0
[t(1− t)]β−1 dt, appears as a
normalization constant, and the parameter β > 0. The arcsine distri-
bution, which is a special case of the beta distribution with β = 1/2,
has pdf
dP ∗W (w) =
1
pi
√
w(1− w) (4.3)
on (0, 1). The arcsine distribution was first used in generating random-
ized fingerprinting codes by Tardos [4] and is sometimes referred to as
the “Tardos distribution” in the literature.
2. Collusion Channel
Suppose Pc is compact and user- and symbol-symmetric. Then by
Theorem 3.6 it suffices to consider user-symmetric attacks. Let Z ,∑k
i=1Xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, which is the number of 1’s in XK. User-
symmetry makes Z a sufficient statistic in producing Y . If we let
p = (p0, . . . , pk)
′ where pz , pY |Z(1|z), z = 0, . . . , k, then the collusion
channel can be completely characterized by p. The marking assump-
tion enforces that
p0 = 0 and pk = 1. (4.4)
On the other hand, symbol-symmetry allows us to consider p with
pz = 1− pk−z, z = 0, . . . , k. (4.5)
The interleaving attack p∗ (a.k.a. “uniform channel” in [28] and “blind
colluders” in [29]) defined by
p∗z =
z
k
, z = 0, . . . , k (4.6)
is frequently adopted to model the coalition’s strategy and can be easily
implemented by drawing each yj randomly from x1,j, . . . , xk,j at each
position j. One can verify that it satisfies the marking assumption (4.4)
and is both user- and symbol-symmetric (4.1). We will further discuss
the performance of this attack in Sec. 4.3 and Sec. 4.4.
3. Payoff Functions
Let α(w) = (α0(w), . . . , αk(w))
′ and similarly for α1(w) and α0(w)
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where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z (4.7)
is the binomial law with parameter w and k trials, and
α1z(w) , pZ|X1W (z|1, w) =
{ (
k−1
z−1
)
wz−1(1− w)k−z, 1 ≤ z ≤ k
0, z = 0
(4.8)
and
α0z(w) , pZ|X1W (z|0, w) =
{ (
k−1
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z−1, 0 ≤ z ≤ k − 1
0, z = k
(4.9)
are the (shifted for α1(w)) binomial laws with parameter w and k − 1
trials.
Recall that W → XK → Z → Y forms a Markov chain. We have
pY |X1W (1|x,w) =
k∑
z=0
pZ|X1W (z|x,w)pY |Z(1|z)
=
k∑
z=0
αxz (w)pz = α
x′p (4.10)
for x = 0, 1. The payoff function for the joint fingerprinting game is
then
I jointk,2 (w,p) =
1
k
I(XK;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
I(Z;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
[H(Y |W = w)−H(Y |Z,W = w)]
=
1
k
[
h2
(
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz
)
−
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h2(pz)
]
=
1
k
[h2(α
′p)−α′h2(p)] . (4.11)
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Another representation of I jointk,2 is
I jointk,2 (w,p) =
1
k
D2(pZY |W ‖ pZ|WpY |W |W = w)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
1∑
y=0
pZ|W (z|w)pY |Z(y|z) log2
pY |Z(y|z)
pY |W (y|w)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w)
[
pz log2
pz
α′p
+ (1− pz) log2
1− pz
1−α′p
]
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d2(pz ‖ α′p). (4.12)
For the simple fingerprinting game, we have
Isimplek,2 (w,p) = I(X1;Y |W = w)
= D2(pX1Y |W ‖ pX1|WpY |W |W = w)
=
1∑
x=0
1∑
y=0
pX1|W (x|w)pY |X1W (y|x,w) log2
pY |X1W (y|x,w)
pY |W (y|w)
= wD2(pY |X1=1,W=w ‖ pY |W=w)
+(1− w)D2(pY |X1=0,W=w ‖ pY |W=w)
(a)
= wd2(α
1′p ‖ α′p) + (1− w)d2(α0′p ‖ α′p) (4.13)
where (a) follows from (4.10).
4. Fingerprinting Games
The fingerprinting games for the binary alphabet can now be written as
Ck,2(Pe,Pc) = max
PW
min
p
EPW [Ik,2(W,p)] (4.14)
= min
p
max
PW
EPW [Ik,2(W,p)] (4.15)
where the maximization is subject to PW ∈ Pe and the symbol-symmetry
condition (4.1) while the minimization is subject to p ∈ Pc and the
symbol-symmetry condition (4.5). The maximizing and minimizing
strategies are denoted by P
(k,2)
W and p
(k,2) respectively. If Pe satisfies
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Condition 2.2, then by Lemma 3.5 we have
Ck,2(Pe,Pc) = min
p
max
w
Ik,2(w,p) (4.16)
where the maximization is subject to w ∈ supp(Pe).
4.2 Analysis of the Convex Games
We consider the following three cases:
1. Colluders’ Strategy is Fixed
Pc = {p} in this case. For general Pe the game is still an infinite-
dimensional maximization problem. However when Condition 2.2 is
satisfied, it reduces to one-dimensional by (4.16) and a simple line
search gives us the capacity under collusion channel p. Note that for
any p ∈ PRDM, Ck,2(Pe,p) is an upper bound on Ck,2(Pe,PRDM).
2. Fingerprinting Embedder’s Strategy is Fixed
Pe = {PW} in this case. The game reduces to a Θ(k)-dimensional min-
imization problem. Since the payoff function EPW [Ik,2(W,p)] is convex
in p, we use the conditional gradient method to solve the constrained
convex optimization problem (4.14) (see [30]). For the joint finger-
printing game, Furon and Perez-Freire [22] proposed a Blahut-Arimoto
algorithm which, however, cannot be applied to the simple fingerprint-
ing game. Note that for any PW ∈ PW , Ck,2(PW ,Pe) is a lower bound
on Ck,2(PW ,Pe).
3. Fingerprinting Capacities Under the Marking Assumption
We consider specifically Pe = PW and Pc = PRDM. Solving the max-
imin game of (4.14) or the minimax game of (4.16) is much more diffi-
cult than solving the above maximization or minimization problems. In
particular, the alternating maximization and minimization algorithm
generally diverges.
Owing to the existence of a saddle-point solution, p(k,2) and p
(k,2)
W (note
that it is a pmf by Theorem 3.6) must satisfy the following:
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(a) When p = p(k,2) is fixed, Ik,2(w,p
(k,2)) is a differentiable function
over the unit interval. The support supp
(
p
(k,2)
W
)
of p
(k,2)
W can only
take values at the maximizers of Ik,2(w,p
(k,2)) [25, §2.5]. Hence
we have 
Ik,2(w,p
(k,2)) = Ck,2(PW ,PRDM)
∂
∂w
Ik,2(w,p
(k,2)) = 0
∂2
∂w2
Ik,2(w,p
(k,2)) < 0
(4.17)
for any w ∈ supp
(
p
(k,2)
W
)
.
(b) When pW = p
(k,2)
W is fixed and the constraint (4.5) is imposed, we
have
E
p
(k,2)
W
[
∂
∂pz
Ik,2(W,p
(k,2))
]
= 0, z = 1, . . . , k − 1. (4.18)
By the convexity in p of the payoff function, we have
∣∣∣supp(p(k,2)W )∣∣∣ ≤ k
(see [25, §2.5]). With a fixed spectrum cardinality, we can obtain can-
didate capacity-achieving strategies p
(k,2)
W and p
(k,2) by solving (4.17)
and (4.18), and then verify whether those candidate distributions are
optimal by examining the second partial derivatives. Once p(k,2) and
p
(k,2)
W are found, we can evaluate Ck,2(PW ,PRDM) by substituting them
into (4.14).
Numerical solutions to the joint and simple fingerprinting games are shown
in Fig. 4.1-4.3. Observe that capacities for both games (Fig. 4.1(a)-(b)), the
optimal distributions P
(k,2)
W for both games (Fig. 4.2(a)-(b)), and the opti-
mal attacks p(k,2) for the joint fingerprinting game (Fig. 4.3(a)) all seem to
converge as k grows. The optimal attacks p(k,2) for the simple fingerprinting
game (Fig. 4.3(b)), however, exhibit some wild oscillations in both ampli-
tude and frequency as k grows. We will study the asymptotics of the joint
fingerprinting game for large k in the next section.
4.3 Capacity Bounds
The analysis of Sec. 4.2 allows us to solve the fingerprinting game numerically
for small k. However, evaluating or even approximating the capacity value
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Figure 4.1: Capacities Ck,2(PW ,PRDM), Ck,2(PW ,p∗), Ck,2(f ∗W ,PRDM), and
upper and lower bounds of the (a) joint and (b) simple fingerprinting games
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative distribution function of the arcsine distribution P ∗W
and the optimal distributions P
(k,2)
W for the (a) joint and (b) simple
fingerprinting games under the marking assumption
for large k is still a difficult task. In this subsection, we provide tight upper
and lower bounds on capacity.
For simplicity of notation, we let
gk(w) , pY |W (1|w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz = α(w)
′p (4.19)
which by the definition of αz(w) in (4.7) is a polynomial in w of degree ≤ k.
Note that gk(0) = p0 = 0 and gk(1) = pk = 1 by the marking assumption.
The following lemmas will be useful for the proofs:
Lemma 4.1 (Pinsker’s inequality). [26, Lemma 11.6.1]
d2(r ‖ s) ≥ 2
ln 2
(r − s)2. (4.20)
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Figure 4.3: The interleaving attack p∗ and the optimal attacks p(k,2) for the
(a) joint and (b) simple fingerprinting games under the marking assumption
Lemma 4.2. Equalities
α1
′
p−α′p = 1− w
k
g′k(w)
and
α0
′
p−α′p = −w
k
g′k(w)
hold for z = 0, . . . , k and w ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The equalities follow directly from (4.7), (4.8), (4.9), and (4.19).
Lemma 4.3. Let dPW be a pdf on [0, 1]. Then∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w) ≥ pi
2 (4.21)
with equality if and only if dPW is the arcsine distribution of (4.3).
Proof. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w) ≥
[∫ 1
0
dw√
w(1−w)
]2
∫ 1
0
dPW (w)dw
= pi2.
Equality holds if and only if dPW (w) ∝ 1√
w(1−w) , which leads us to the arcsine
distribution.
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4.3.1 Upper Bounds
The following two theorems bound from above capacities under the inter-
leaving attack of (4.6).
Theorem 4.4. [1, Theorem 4.2]
C jointk,2 (PW ,p∗) ≤
1
k2 ln 2
. (4.22)
Proof.
C jointk,2 (PW ,p∗) = max
w∈[0,1]
I jointk,2 (w,p
∗)
(a)
=
1
k
max
w∈[0,1]
{
h2(w)−
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h2
(z
k
)}
(b)
≤ 1
k2 ln 2
where (a) follows from (4.11) and (b) results from [28, Theorem 4.3].
Theorem 4.5. [31, Proposition 4.2]
Csimplek,2 (PW ,p∗) = 1− h2
(
1
2
+
1
2k
)
=
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
. (4.23)
Proof. It can be shown that Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗) takes its maximum at w = 1/2
(See Appendix A.1). Hence
Csimplek,2 (PW ,p∗) = max
w∈[0,1]
Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗)
= 1− h2
(
1
2
+
1
2k
)
=
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
.
4.3.2 Lower Bounds
The following theorem provides a lower bound on both the joint and simple
capacities under a continuous probability distribution dPW .
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Theorem 4.6. Let PW has a pdf dPW on [0, 1]. Then
C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) ≥ Csimplek,2 (PW ,PRDM) ≥
2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
.
(4.24)
The lower bound is maximized when PW = P
∗
W where it takes the value
2
k2pi2 ln 2
.
Proof. For any p ∈ PRDM, we have
EPW
[
Isimplek,2 (W,p)
]
(a)
=
∫ 1
0
[
wd2(α
1′p ‖ α′p) + (1− w)d2(α0′p ‖ α′p)
]
dPW (w)dw
(b)
≥ 2
ln 2
∫ 1
0
[
w(α1
′
p−α′p)2 + (1− w)(α0′p−α′p)2
]
dPW (w)dw
(c)
=
2
k2 ln 2
∫ 1
0
[g′k(w)]
2
w(1− w)dPW (w)dw
(d)
≥ 2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
g′k(w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1−w)
(e)
=
2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
.
(a) follows from (4.13). (b) follows from Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 4.1).
(c) follows from Lemma 4.2. (d) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Finally, (e) follows from the marking assumption. Hence
Csimplek,2 (PW ,PRDM) = min
p∈PRDM
EPW
[
Isimplek,2 (W,p)
]
≥ 2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
.
Following Lemma 4.3, the lower bound is maximized when PW = P
∗
W , which
coincides with the lower bound given in [31].
The following corollaries summarizes the upper and lower bounds on ca-
pacities under the marking assumption:
Corollary 4.7.
2
k2pi2 ln 2
≤ C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) ≤
1
k2 ln 2
. (4.25)
32
Corollary 4.8.
2
k2pi2 ln 2
≤ Csimplek,2 (PW ,PRDM) ≤
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
. (4.26)
4.4 Asymptotics for Large Coalitions
The upper and lower bounds on C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) provided in the previous
section are within a factor of about five. As can be seen in Fig. 4.1, the
numerical results suggest that C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) approximates (k22 ln 2)−1
even for small values of k. Amiri and Tardos [2] claimed the same asymptotic
rate but only provided the proof for the lower bound in [32, Theorem 15].
Here we analyze not only this rate but the complete asymptotics of the joint
fingerprinting game.
We consider the sequence of mutual information games for joint decoding.
To study the asymptotics when k → ∞, we first assume that the collusion
channel p satisfies the following regularity condition:
Condition 4.1. There exists a bounded and twice differentiable function
g(w) on [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 such that
pz = g
(z
k
)
, ∀z ∈ {0, . . . , k}. (4.27)
Certainly the condition restricts the colluders’ strategy to a smaller space.
We however claim that this is a very mild limitation on their power for the
following reasons:
1. For each k, the collusion channels take values of g at only the lattice
points in [0, 1], hence intuitively the class of collusion channels satisfy-
ing Condition 4.1 remains large.
2. Fig. 4.4 shows the minimizing collusion channels p(k,2) for several dif-
ferent embedding distributions. For each case it seems the continuous
interpolation of p does converge to some g on [0, 1]. Indeed, our fol-
lowing analysis still holds if we relax the restriction of (5.12) to
pz = g
(z
k
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
, ∀z ∈ {0, . . . , k}. (4.28)
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The following reparameterization of the class (5.12) of collusion channels
will simplify our analysis:
Definition 4.2. Let G and J be functions on [0, 1] defined as
G(w) , cos−1[1− 2g(w)] (4.29)
and
J(w) , w(1− w)[G′(w)]2 (4.30)
where g(w) satisfies Condition 4.1.
The outline of our asymptotic analysis is as follows: we fix w ∈ (0, 1)
and we study the asymptotics of I jointk,2 (w,p). The binomial distribution of
Z can be approximated by the Gaussian distribution with mean kw and
variance kw(1−w), and by which we can approximate the dominating terms
of I jointk,2 (w,p). Theorem 4.11 yields I
joint
k,2 (w,p) ∼ J(w)/(k22 ln 2), where J
is the transformation of g defined in (4.30). The maximin game with J as
the payoff function can be solved explicitly and hence the asymptotics of the
fingerprinting game can be obtained.
The following lemmas will be useful for our analysis:
Lemma 4.9. [33, Sec. 2.5]
d2(r ‖ s) = (r − s)
2
s(1− s)2 ln 2 +O(|r − s|
3). (4.31)
Lemma 4.10. For Z ∼ Binomial(k, w), we have
Pr[|Z − kw| ≥
√
k ln k] ≤ 1/k2. (4.32)
Proof. This is special case of Hoeffding’s inequality (see [34]).
Recall that the expectation of Y given W = w, which we denote by gk(w)
in (4.19), can be written as
gk(w) , pY |W (1|w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)g
(z
k
)
where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z
34
is the binomial pmf which concentrates around its mean kw as k →∞. gk is
a polynomial in w of degree ≤ k and is known as the Bernstein polynomial of
order k of the function g [35]. By Condition 4.1 g is bounded and the second
derivative g′′(w) exists; therefore, from Bernstein [35, §1.6] we have
gk(w) = g(w) +
w(1− w)
2k
g′′(w) + o
(
1
k
)
. (4.33)
On the other hand, for z = k(w + ), we have
pz = g
(z
k
)
= g(w + )
= g(w) + g′(w) +O
(
2
)
. (4.34)
We now write the asymptotic approximation of I jointk,2 in terms of g.
Firstly by the bounds presented in Sec. 4.3, we can focus on w and g such
that I jointk,2 (w,p) = Ω(1/k
2). Let δ =
√
ln k/k. We have
I jointk,2 (w,p)
(a)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d2(pz ‖ gk(w))
(b)∼ 1
k
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w) d2(pz ‖ gk(w)) (4.35)
where (a) follows from (4.12) and (4.19) and (b) from Lemma 4.10.
Now if we let z = kw + η, where η = O(
√
k ln k), then by (4.34) we have
pz = g(w) +
η
k
g′(w) +O
(
η2
k2
)
(4.36)
and combining with (4.33) we have
pz − gk(w) = η
k
g′(w) +O
(
ln k
k
)
. (4.37)
for η = ω(1). The contribution to (4.35) for η = O(1) decays exponentially
with k and thus can be neglected.
By (4.37) and Lemma A.2, we have
d2(pz ‖ gk(w)) = [pz − gk(w)]
2
gk(w)(1− gk(w))2 ln 2 + o
(
1
k
)
(4.38)
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and hence (4.35) yields
I jointk,2 (w,p)
(a)∼ 1
k2 ln 2
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w)
[pz − gk(w)]2
gk(w)(1− gk(w))
(b)∼ [g
′(w)]2
k3g(w)(1− g(w))2 ln 2
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w) (z − kw)2
(c)∼ [g
′(w)]2w(1− w)
k2g(w)(1− g(w))2 ln 2
(d)
=
1
k22 ln 2
J(w) (4.39)
where (a) follows from (4.38), (b) from (4.33) and (4.37), (c) from Lemma
4.10, and (d) directly from the definitions in (4.29) and (4.30). The following
theorem concludes what we have proved thus far:
Theorem 4.11. Assume that Condition 4.1 is satisfied, then
I jointk,2 (w,p) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
J(w), ∀w ∈ (0, 1). (4.40)
The joint fingerprinting game of (4.16) can now be approximated by the
game with J as its payoff function. We consider continuous probability dis-
tributions PW satisfying the following condition:
Condition 4.3. The probability distribution PW has a is continuous pdf dPW
on [0, 1] with ∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w) <∞. (4.41)
The following lemma shows the solution to the minimization problem with
J as its payoff function.
Lemma 4.12. Let g(w) satisfy Condition 4.1 and fix PW satisfying Condi-
tion 4.3. Then
min
g
EPW [J(W )]
= min
g
∫ 1
0
J(w)dPW (w)dw = pi
2
[∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
(4.42)
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where J is defined in (4.30). The minimum is achieved by
gopt(w) =
1
2
[
1− cos
(
pi
∫ w
0
dv
dPW (v)v(1−v)∫ 1
0
dv
dPW (v)v(1−v)
)]
. (4.43)
Proof. We have∫
J(w)dPW (w)dw =
∫ 1
0
w(1− w)[G′(w)]2dPW (w)dw
(a)
≥
[∫ 1
0
G′(w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
dw
w(1−w)dPW (w)
(b)
= pi2
[∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
(4.44)
where (a) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (b) follows from
the boundary conditions G(0) = 0 and G(1) = pi following directly from
Condition 4.1 and the definition of (4.29). Equality holds in (a) when
G′opt(w) =
pi∫ 1
0
dv
dPW (v)v(1−v)
· 1
dPW (w)w(1− w) , (4.45)
which leads us to (4.43) by (4.29).
Corollary 4.13. For PW satisfying Condition 4.3, we have
C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) ∼
pi2
k22 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
dPW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
. (4.46)
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 4.11 and Lemma 4.12.
Corollary 4.14.
C jointk,2 (P
∗
W ,PRDM) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
. (4.47)
Proof. The right-hand side of (4.46) is maximized when PW = P
∗
W by Lemma
4.3. Also note that by (4.43) we have gopt(w) = w, which leads us to the
interleaving attack.
Corollary 4.15. The interleaving attack is an “equalizing strategy” for the
colluders that makes the payoff function J(w) asymptotically independent of
w:
I jointk,2 (w,p
∗) ∼ 1
k22 ln 2
, ∀w ∈ (0, 1). (4.48)
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Figure 4.4: gopt(z/k) and minimizing collusion channels p
(k,2) for k = 10,
20, and 30 and PW = Beta(β, β)
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30, and 50 and PW = Beta(β, β)
Proof. Let g(w) = w. Then p becomes the interleaving attack by (5.12) and
J(w) ≡ 1 by Definition 4.2.
Corollary 4.16. The fingerprinting capacity under the marking assumption
satisfies
C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
. (4.49)
Furthermore, the arcsine distribution P ∗W and the interleaving attack p
∗ are
the respective maximizing and minimizing strategies that achieve the asymp-
totic capacity value.
Proof. The asymptotic relations (4.47) and (4.48) establish matching asymp-
totic lower and upper bounds on C jointk,2 (PW ,PRDM) respectively.
4.5 Numerical Results for Beta Distributions
We now use the family of Beta distributions to illustrate the asymptotics of
the joint fingerprinting game. Let P βW be the probability distribution defined
in (4.2). Condition 4.3 is satisfied for any β ∈ (0, 1). For β = 1/3, 1/2, and
2/3, we find the minimizing collusion channels p(k,2) for P βW and compare
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them with gopt(z/k) obtained by (4.43). Fig. 4.4 shows that p
(k,2)
z does
converge to gopt(z/k) as k → ∞ as expected, which also rationalizes our
assumption of Condition 4.1.
Consider the normalized payoff function I˜ jointk,2 (w,p) , k22 ln 2 · I jointk,2 (w,p),
which by Theorem 4.11 is asymptotically close to J(w). Suppose Jopt is
obtained by substituting gopt of (4.43) into (4.29) and (4.30). Again for
β = 1/3, 1/2, and 2/3, we compare I˜ jointk,2 (w,p
(k,2)) with Jopt(w) in Fig. 4.5.
As shown in the figure, I˜ jointk,2 (w,p
(k,2)) is asymptotically flat over (0, 1) when
β = 1/2, which is the case when P βW is chosen properly. If β < 1/2, which
means P βW has too much weight around 0 and 1, then the colluders’ choice of
gopt makes Jopt peak at w = 1/2. If on the contrary β > 1/2, then too much
weight around 1/2 is put on P βW , and gopt makes Jopt peaks at w = 0, 1.
4.6 Why Are the Arcsine Distribution and the
Interleaving Attack Optimal for Large Coalitions?
The analysis and the numerical results above show not only that the asymp-
totic capacity is (k22 ln 2)−1, but also that both the arcsine distribution for
the maximizer and the interleaving attack for the minimizer achieve the same
asymptotic value. Such results are very interesting, and at the same time
raise some issues for further investigation. One topic concerns the regularity
constraint (Condition 4.1) upon which the asymptotic analysis in Sec. 4.4
is based. However, it is reasonable to conjecture that the same asymptotics
hold without the regularity condition. Our numerical results indeed suggest
this condition may not be necessary. Moreover, it is important to mention
that both the asymptotic lower bound on capacity (see [32, Theorem 15])
and Corollary 4.15 (which contributes to the asymptotic upper bound) hold
without the regularity constraint.
Both the arcsine distribution and the interleaving attack have been exten-
sively studied in the literature. In 2003, Tardos applied the arcsine distri-
bution to fingerprinting [4]. How he fine-tuned his codes, however, had been
a mystery until Sˇkoric´ et al. [36] and Furon et al. [29] rationalized Tardos’
choices based on Gaussian approximations. On the other hand, the inter-
leaving attack has been frequently adopted to model the collusion channel
in the literature [28, 29, 22], but no conceptual reasoning has been proposed
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on why it should be the coalition’s optimal choice. Fortunately, owing to the
discovery of the capacity formulas (Theorem 3.4), we can now study finger-
printing games from the information-theoretic point of view. In the previous
subsection, we established the optimality of these two strategies based on
asymptotic methods. Here we provide a statistical interpretation.
We may think of the (joint) fingerprinting capacity game as follows: the
coalition is given k independent observations X1, . . . , Xk distributed accord-
ing to an unknown distribution Bernoulli(W ) chosen at random by the fin-
gerprinting embedder from the family {Bernoulli(W ) : W ∈ [0, 1]} according
to a known prior distribution PW . Upon generating Y according to the
conditional distribution pY |Z given the sufficient statistic Z =
∑k
i=1 Xi, the
coalition suffers a loss I(Z;Y |W = w). The risk of the game I(Z;Y |W ) is
the average loss under PW .
As emphasized in previous works [3, 22], the choice of the embedding
distribution PW , or prior selection in statistician’s language, is crucial to the
fingerprinting game. If no randomization takes place [37], or equivalently, if
the realization w is revealed to the pirates [22], then the maximin game value
decays exponentially with coalition size k (see (3.5)). Loosely speaking, the
loss the pirates suffer is mainly due to their error in estimating W . If they
have a good estimation of the time-sharing random variable W , then the loss
they suffer is small.
Jeffreys’ prior [38] is a “non-informative” prior that plays an important
role in Bayesian statistics. Given a family of distributions with an unknown
parameter, Jeffreys’ prior is proportional to the square root of the Fisher
information. Conceptually speaking, Jeffreys’ prior is the “least-favorable”
distribution in regard to estimating that parameter. For the Bernoulli trial
with the probability of success w as parameter, the Fisher information is
I(w) = [w(1− w)]−1 and thus Jeffreys’ prior is
f(w) ∝ 1√
w(1− w) (4.50)
which is exactly the arcsine distribution!
The optimality of the interleaving attack is closely related to the concept
of “equalizer rule” in game theory. From Corollary 4.15, interleaving is the
asymptotic equalizing strategy, which is the desirable attribute we expect for
a saddle-point solution. The optimal collusion channel depends on the prior
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by (4.43), and from the proof of Corollary 4.14, the interleaving attack is opti-
mal under the arcsine distribution. Also observe that the interleaving attack
is the strategy where the colluders generate Y according to Bernoulli(Ŵ ),
where Ŵ = Z/k is the maximum likelihood estimator of W , which is asymp-
totically unbiased (as k →∞) and has minimum asymptotic variance (equal
to (kI(w))−1 = w(1− w)/k).
Another interesting question is what are the asymptotics of the simple fin-
gerprinting game. In Corollary 4.8, we established upper and lower bounds on
Csimplek,2 . Note that the upper bound is obtained by assuming the interleaving
attack for the coalition and it coincides with the asymptotic rate (k22 ln 2)−1
of C jointk,2 . On the other hand, Fig. 4.3(b) indicates that the optimal attack
is actually quite different from the interleaving attack. This suggests that
the pirates can exploit the suboptimality of the single-user decoder and per-
form a stronger attack. The study of the exact asymptotics of the simple
fingerprinting game is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
ARBITRARY ALPHABET
FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY UNDER
THE COMBINED DIGIT MODEL
In this chapter we study the joint and simple fingerprinting games with k
pirates for arbitrary alphabet under the combined digit model. For small
k, capacities along with optimal strategies for both players of the game are
obtained explicitly. For large k, we extend our previous asymptotic analysis
for the binary alphabet with the marking assumption to this general model
and show that capacity is asymptotic to A/k2 where the constant A is spec-
ified as the maximin value of a continuous functional game. Saddle-point
solutions to the game are obtained using methods of variational calculus.
5.1 Fighting Small Coalitions
Owing to the existence of the saddle-point solutions, the joint and simple
fingerprinting capacity games can be solved either analytically or numerically
when k is small. In the previous chapter we showed solutions for the binary
alphabet case. Our algorithm can be generalized to the q-ary alphabet with
the combined digit model. Also we impose both the user-symmetry and the
symbol-symmetry constraints discussed in Chap. 3.
5.1.1 One Pirate
For k = 1, the joint and simple capacity games are the same. The maximin
games of (3.9) and (3.10) reduce to compound channel capacity games [39], or
to watermarking games [40]. For the four variants of the marking assumption,
capacity is trivially one. For CDM, the optimal embedding distribution is
W
(k,q)
x ≡ 1/q for all x ∈ X . Upon receiving z = [1, 0, · · · , 0]′, the colluder
utilizes strategy θ(z) = [1− pc − pe, pc/(q − 1), · · · , pc/(q − 1), pe]′ where pc
is the crossover probability and pe is the erasure probability. The optimal
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Figure 5.1: Fingerprinting capacities C1,q(PCDM)
strategy is p
(k,q)
e = re,1 and p
(k,q)
c = min
{
q−1
q
(1− re,1), rc,1
}
. Capacity is
given by
C joint1,q (PCDM) = Csimple1,q (PCDM)
=
{
(1− re,1)
[
1− hq
(
re,1
1− re,1
)]
− rc,1 logq(q − 1)
}
+
where (x)+ , max(x, 0). Capacities using parameters in [6] are shown in
Fig. 5.1. We can see that the loss in capacity from the ideal case is about
20% if parameters are chosen properly.
5.1.2 Two Pirates
By studying the simplest case involving collusion attacks, we can see how
different models allow different strengths of attacks. By symbol-symmetry
there are only two types of patterns in Z, namely z1 = [2, 0, . . . , 0]′ and
z2 = [1, 1, 0, . . . , 0]
′. Similar to the analysis in 5.1.1, the crossover probabili-
ties pc and the erasure probabilities pe determine the collusion attack. More
specifically, we let θ(z1) =
[
1− pc,1 − pe,1, pc,1q−1 , · · · , pc,1q−1 , pe,1
]′
and θ(z2) =[
1−pc,2−pe,2
2
, 1−pc,2−pe,2
2
, pc,2
q−2 , · · · , pc,2q−2 , pe,2
]′
due to symbol-symmetry. The op-
timal collusion channel can then be characterized by p
(k,q)
c and p
(k,q)
e .
• Restricted Digit Model: Under RDM, pc = pe = 0 and the optimal
embedding distribution is W
(k,q)
x ≡ 1/q for all x ∈ X for both the joint
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and simple capacity games. Capacities are given by
C joint2,q (PW,PRDM) =
1
2
(
1− q − 1
q
logq 2
)
(5.1)
Csimple2,q (PW,PRDM) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
q
)
logq(q + 1)− logq 2. (5.2)
• Unreadable Digit Model: UDM allows the coalition to generate
erasures but not unseen symbols. For q = 2 and 3, the colluders’
optimal attack does not utilize erasures even they are allowed to do so.
For q ≥ 4, p(2,q)e,2 is nonzero and randomization of W is necessary.
• Arbitrary/General/Combined Digit Model: In these models p(2,q)c,2
and/or p
(2,q)
e,2 are nonzero and randomization of W is necessary for some
cases for q = 3.
Numerical solutions for the joint capacity game for binary and ternary
alphabets are shown in Table 5.1. The simple capacity game has similar
results. We see that ADM does allow stronger attacks than UDM, which
essentially says that the coalition would prefer generating unseen symbols
over erasures. A simple way to explain this is that when observing an era-
sure symbol, the decoder learns that (for sure or with high probability) the
colluders have more than one symbol in that coordinate. On the other hand,
generating an unseen symbol can divert the decoder to accuse some innocent
users. Such preference can also be seen by observing the solutions to CDM
with different parameters.
5.2 Asymptotics for Large Coalitions
The analysis in Sec. 5.1 allows us to solve the fingerprinting games for small
coalitions. However, the solution itself has cardinality in the order of kq−1.
For the binary case this grows linearly with k and we showed the solutions for
up to tens of pirates [7]. For the nonbinary case, the curse of dimensionality
makes the task difficult even for small k. Therefore good approximations of
the games’ solutions for large-coalition asymptotics (k →∞) are important.
Independently of our work, Boesten and Sˇkoric´ [41] extended our asymptotic
results in [7] to nonbinary alphabets under RDM. The analysis showed that
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Table 5.1: Saddle-Point Solutions for the Joint Capacity Game: Coalition
Size k = 2 and Alphabet Size q = 2, 3
q Model C joint2,q
Embed distribution Collusion channel
w(2,q)
′
p
(2,q)
W p
(2,q)
c,1 p
(2,q)
c,2 p
(2,q)
e,1 p
(2,q)
e,2
2
(R,U,A,G)DM .25 [.5, .5] 1 0 0 0 0
CDM1 .18 [.5, .5] 1 .01 .01 .20 .20
CDM2 .16 [.5, .5] 1 .05 .05 .06 .06
CDM3 .13 [.5, .5] 1 .10 .10 .03 .03
3
(R,U)DM .29 [.33, .33, .33] 1 0 0 0 0
*(A,G)DM .19 [.06, .47, .47] .33 0 .17 0 0
CDM1 .19 [.33, .33, .33] 1 .01 .01 .20 .48
CDM2 .18 [.33, .33, .33] 1 .05 .05 .06 .22
CDM3 .14 [.33, .33, .33] 1 .10 .10 .03 .10
*Note: The optimal distribution takes probability mass 1/3 at
permutations of w(2,q) shown. All other rows the optimal distributions take
w(2,q) with probability one.
the asymptotic joint capacity is (q − 1)/(2k2 ln q) but it did not reveal the
optimal strategies. Here we show how to extend our analysis of [7] to the
more general combined digit model for both the joint and simple capacity
games and derive optimal strategies. Our main results are the following three
theorems and two corollaries:
Theorem 5.1. Assume that Condition 5.1 (defined below) is satisfied, then
we have
C jointk,q (Pe,Pc) ∼ Csimplek,q (Pe,Pc) ∼
A(Pe,Pc)
2k2 ln q
(5.3)
when A(Pe,Pc) (specified in (5.16)) is nonzero.1 Note that A depends on the
embedding distribution class Pe and the collusion class Pc and is independent
of the coalition size k.
Theorem 5.2. The binary (q = 2) fingerprinting capacities under CDM with
0 ≤ re,1 = re,2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ rc,1 < (1− re,1)/2 satisfy
C jointk,2 (PCDM) ∼ Csimplek,2 (PCDM) ∼
(1− re,1)
(
1− 4
pi
sin−1
√
rc,1
1−re,1
)2
2k2 ln 2
. (5.4)
1With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation Pc as in Sec. 2 where it
is defined for a fixed coalition size k. The collusion class Pc here represents a sequence
of collusion channels as k →∞ and is in general non-compact. A detailed explanation of
the compactness of Pc is provided in Sec. 5.2.3
45
Furthermore, the maximizing and minimizing strategies that achieve the asymp-
totic capacity value are respectively the arcsine distribution dP ∗W(w0, w1) ∝
(w0w1)
−1/2dw and θ(z) defined by
θ0(z) = (1− re,1) cos2 γ1 (5.5a)
θ1(z) = (1− re,1) sin2 γ1 (5.5b)
θe(z) = re,1 (5.5c)
where γ1 =
(
1− 4
pi
γmax
)
φ1+γmax, φ1 = sin
−1√ z1
k
, and γmax = sin
−1
√
rc,1
1−re,1 .
For 0 ≤ re,1 = re,2 ≤ 1 but rc,1 ≥ (1 − re,1)/2, we have C jointk,2 (PCDM) =
Csimplek,2 (PCDM) = 0 and the minimizing strategy is θ(z) ≡ [(1 − re,1)/2, (1 −
re,1)/2, re,1]
′ for all z.
Corollary 5.3. For q = 2, RDM is the special case of CDM with re,1 =
re,2 = rc,1 = 0, under which we have
C jointk,2 (PRDM) ∼ Csimplek,2 (PRDM) ∼
1
2k2 ln 2
. (5.6)
The arcsine distribution dP ∗W(w0, w1) ∝ (w0w1)−1/2dw and the interleaving
attack
θ∗(z) =
[
1
k
z
0
]
(5.7)
are the respective maximizing and minimizing strategies that achieve the
asymptotic capacity value.
Theorem 5.4. The fingerprinting capacities under CDM with 0 ≤ re,1 =
· · · = re,q ≤ 1 and rc = 0 satisfies
C jointk,q (PCDM) ∼ Csimplek,q (PCDM) ∼
(1− re,1)(q − 1)
2k2 ln q
. (5.8)
Furthermore, dP ∗W(w) ∝
∏
xw
−1/2
x dw and
θ(z) =
[
1−re,1
k
z
re,1
]
(5.9)
are the respective maximizing and minimizing strategies that achieve the
asymptotic capacity value.
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Corollary 5.5. RDM is the special case of CDM with re = 0 and rc = 0,
under which we have
C jointk,q (PRDM) ∼ Csimplek,q (PRDM) ∼
q − 1
2k2 ln q
. (5.10)
The distribution dP ∗W(w) ∝
∏
xw
−1/2
x dw and the interleaving attack
θ∗(z) =
[
1
k
z
0
]
(5.11)
are the respective maximizing and minimizing strategies that achieve the
asymptotic capacity value.
5.2.1 Continuous Functional Game Approximation
We consider the sequence of joint/simple fingerprinting games. Similarly
to [7], we impose a regularity condition on the collusion channel Θ. The
q-dimensional simplex is denoted by G , {g ∈ Rq+1 : ‖g‖1 = 1,g ≥ 0}.
Condition 5.1. There exists a bounded and twice differentiable function
g :W → G such that2
θ(z) = g
(
1
k
z
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
(5.12)
as k →∞.
The condition assumes a smooth limiting function of z for the sequence of
collusion channels. For the binary case, the assumption seems valid for the
joint capacity game but not for the simple capacity game [7]. However, as
the simple decoding scheme is suboptimal, this assumption does not seem
overly restrictive.
Under the regularity constraint, the following theorem is instrumental to
prove Theorem 5.1. It reduces the payoff functions for the joint/simple ca-
pacity games to a functional T [w,g,∇g] where ∇g is the (q+1)×q Jacobian
matrix of g versus w. The proof is given in Appendix A.2. Denote by∇gy(w)
the gradient row vector of gy with respect to w and by diag(w) the diagonal
matrix whose diagonal entries are the components of w.
2The little-o notation is defined uniformly over all z ∈ Z.
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Theorem 5.6. Assume that Condition 5.1 is satisfied, then
I jointk,q (w,Θ) ∼ Isimplek,q (w,Θ) ∼
T [w,g,∇g]
2k2 ln q
(5.13)
as k →∞ where
T [w,g,∇g] ,
∑
y∈Y
∇gy(w) [diag(w)−ww′]∇′gy(w)
gy(w)
(5.14)
=
∑
y∈Y
1
gy(w)
∑
x∈Q
wx
(
∂gy(w)
∂wx
)2
−
(∑
x∈Q
wx
∂gy(w)
∂wx
)2 .
(5.15)
5.2.2 Change of Variables
By Theorem 5.6 it is straightforward to prove Theorem 5.1 if we let A(Pe,Pc)
be the value of the following functional maximin game:3
A(Pe,Pc) , sup
PW
inf
g
∫
W
T [w,g,∇g] dPW(w) (5.16)
where the maximization is subject to PW ∈ Pe and the minimization is
subject to constraints of Pc. Before solving the functional maximin game of
(5.16), we first simplify the payoff functional T by making the following
two changes of variables. The first transforms (w,g) on the product of
simplices W × G to (v,h) on the product of hyperspheres V × H defined
by V , {v ∈ Rq : ‖v‖2 = 1,v ≥ 0} and H , {h ∈ Rq+1 : ‖h‖2 = 1,h ≥ 0},
which is similar to that of [41, Sec. 3.4]. The second further transforms
(v,h) into hyperspherical coordinates (φ,γ), which reduces T to the square
of the translated Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix ∇γ of γ versus φ.
Let vx =
√
wx and hy =
√
gy for all x ∈ Q and y ∈ Y and we have
∂gy
∂wx
=
∂gy
∂hy
· ∂hy
∂vx
· ∂vx
∂wx
=
hy
vx
· ∂hy
∂vx
, x ∈ Q, y ∈ Y .
3Note that we change “max-min” to “sup-inf” since the collusion class Pc is in general
non-compact in the asymptotic game. Therefore saddle-point solutions may not exist for
these cases.
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Therefore
T [w,g,∇g] =
∑
y∈Y
1
gy(w)
∑
x∈Q
wx
(
∂gy
∂wx
)2
−
(∑
x∈Q
wx
∂gy
∂wx
)2
=
∑
y∈Y
1
h2y(v)
∑
x∈Q
v2x
(
hy
vx
· ∂hy
∂vx
)2
−
(∑
x∈Q
vx · hy
vx
· ∂hy
∂vx
)2
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Q
(
∂hy
∂vx
)2
−
∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈Q
vx
∂hy
∂vx
)2
= ‖∇h(v)‖2F − ‖∇(h(v))v‖22 , T [v,h,∇h] (5.17)
where v , [v0, . . . , vq−1]′ ∈ Rq, h , [h0, . . . , hq−1, hq = he]′ ∈ Rq+1, ∇h is the
(q+1)×q Jacobian matrix of h versus v, ‖·‖F is the Frobenius norm, and ‖·‖2
is the Euclidean norm. The constraints w ∈ W and g ∈ G translate to v ∈ V
and h ∈ H where V and H are respectively the (q − 1)-dimensional hyper-
sphere V , {v ∈ Rq : ‖v‖2 = 1,v ≥ 0} and the q-dimensional hypersphere
H , {h ∈ Rq+1 : ‖h‖2 = 1,h ≥ 0}.
We then transform (v,h) to hyperspherical coordinates (φ,γ). Let vji , 0 ≤
i ≤ j ≤ q−1 be the vector [vi, · · · , vj]′ ∈ Rj−i+1, φ , [r = φ0, φ1, · · · , φq−1]′ ∈
Rq be defined as
r = ‖v‖2 (5.18a)
φi = cot
−1 vi−1
‖vq−1i ‖2
, 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1 (5.18b)
which has the inverse transformation
v0 = r cosφ1 (5.19a)
v1 = r sinφ1 cosφ2 (5.19b)
...
vq−2 = r sinφ1 · · · sinφq−2 cosφq−1 (5.19c)
vq−1 = r sinφ1 · · · sinφq−2 sinφq−1, (5.19d)
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and γ , [R = γ0, γ1, · · · , γq−1, γq]′ ∈ Rq+1 be defined as
R = ‖hq−10 ‖2 (5.20a)
γj = cot
−1 hj−1
‖hq−1j ‖2
, 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1 (5.20b)
γq = he (5.20c)
which has the inverse transformation
h0 = R cos γ1 (5.21a)
h1 = R sin γ1 cos γ2 (5.21b)
...
hq−2 = R sin γ1 · · · sin γq−2 cos γq−1 (5.21c)
hq−1 = R sin γ1 · · · sin γq−2 sin γq−1 (5.21d)
he = γq. (5.21e)
Now since ∇h = Jhγ∇γJφv where Jhγ is the (q + 1) × (q + 1) Jacobian
matrix of h versus γ, J
φ
v is the q× q Jacobian matrix of φ versus v, and ∇γ
is the (q + 1)× q Jacobian matrix of γ versus φ, we have
T [v,h,∇h]
= ‖∇h‖2F − ‖(∇h)v‖22
= tr (∇h′∇h)− v′(∇h)′(∇h)v
= tr
[(
Jφv
)′
(∇γ)′
(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ∇γJφv
]
− v′
(
Jφv
)′
(∇γ)′
(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ∇γJφv v
= tr
[
(∇γ)′
(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ∇γJφv
(
Jφv
)′]
− tr
[
(∇γ)′
(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ∇γJφv vv′
(
Jφv
)′]
= tr
{
(∇γ)′
(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ∇γ
[
Jφv
(
Jφv
)′
− Jφv vv′
(
Jφv
)′]}
, T [φ,γ,∇γ]
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where tr(A) denotes the trace of square matrix A. By Lemma A.5 we have(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ
= diag
(
1, R2, R2 sin2 γ1, R
2 sin2 γ1 sin
2 γ2, · · · , R2
q−2∏
l=1
sin2 γl, 1
)
(5.22)
Jφv
(
Jφv
)′
− Jφv vv′
= diag
(
1− r2, r−2, r−2 sin−2 φ1, r−2 sin−2 φ1 sin−2 φ2, · · · , r−2
q−2∏
l=1
sin−2 φl
)
.
(5.23)
By incorporating the constraint r = ‖v‖2 ≡ 1 we have
T [φ,γ,∇γ] = tr
[
(∇γ)′Γ˜2∇γΦ˜−2
]
=
∥∥∥Γ˜∇γΦ˜−1∥∥∥2
F
(5.24a)
=
∑
1≤i≤q−1
0≤j≤q
(
∂γj
∂φi
· γ˜j
φ˜i
)2
(5.24b)
where
Γ˜ , diag(γ˜0, · · · , γ˜q)
= diag
(
1, R,R sin γ1, R sin γ1 sin γ2, · · · , R
q−2∏
j=1
sin γj, 1
)
(5.25)
Φ˜
−1 , diag(0, φ˜1
−1
, · · · , φ˜q−1
−1
)
= diag
(
0, 1, sin−1 φ1, sin−1 φ1 sin−1 φ2, · · · ,
q−2∏
i=1
sin−1 φi
)
. (5.26)
The constraints v ∈ V and h ∈ H translate to φ ∈ Φ and γ ∈ Γ where
Φ and Γ are respectively the (q − 1)-dimensional space Φ , {φ ∈ Rq :
r = 1, 0 ≤ φi ≤ pi/2, 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1} and the q-dimensional space Γ ,{
γ ∈ Rq+1 : R2 + γ2q = 1, 0 ≤ γj ≤ pi/2, 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1
}
.
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5.2.3 Solving the Continuous Functional Game
Sec. 5.2.2 reduces the continuous functional game of (5.16) to
A(Pe,Pc) = sup
PΦ
inf
γ
∫
Φ
T [φ,γ,∇γ] dPΦ(φ) (5.27)
where T is defined in (5.24) and maximization and minimization are subject
to constraints on PΦ and γ corresponding to PW ∈ Pe and g ∈ Pc.
In Chap. 4 we solve the game (5.16) for the binary case (q = 2) under
the marking assumption (which is equivalent to RDM, UDM, ADM, and
GDM) without the change of variables trick in Sec. 5.2.2. The minimization
problem of (5.16) is solved explicitly for fixed PW using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, and the maximization problem can then be solved using another
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Indeed since the game of (5.16) has a convex
payoff functional with respect to g (analogously to Theorem 3.6), there exists
a saddle-point solution pair (P∗W,g
∗), which are the arcsine distribution and
the interleaving attack for the binary case. They are the maximizing and
minimizing strategies for the capacity game.
For the binary and nonbinary case under the general combined digit model,
the Cauchy-Schwarz trick does not yield the analytic solution in general.
However, convexity of the payoff functional and the saddle-point property
still hold. Thus if we can find a minimizer γ(φ) for a fixed P ∗Φ such that
T is a constant for all φ (such γ(φ) is also called an “equalizing strategy”),
then
(
P ∗Φ,γ(φ)
)
is the maximizing-minimizing saddle-point strategy pair,
and the value A(Pe,Pc) of the game equals the constant value of T . We
use variational calculus to solve the minimization problem where a set of
Euler-Lagrange differential equations, Lagrange multipliers, and boundary
conditions are specified as necessary and sufficient conditions. Saddle-point
solutions can be obtained analytically for various cases. For details of the
method of variational calculus see [42, 43].
Binary Alphabet with Marking Assumption
We start with the simplest case where q = 2, re = 0, and rc = 0. Instead
of solving the game (5.16) as in [7, Sec. V-A] we solve the much simpler
transformed game (5.27). We fix the uniform distribution dP ∗Φ(φ) ∝ dφ
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which is equivalent to dP ∗W(w0, w1) ∝ (w0w1)−1/2dw. The constraints of the
marking assumption translate to R ≡ 0 and γ2 ≡ 0 and therefore we have
the payoff function
T [φ1,γ,∇γ] =
(
∂R
∂φ1
)2
+R2
(
∂γ1
∂φ1
)2
+
(
∂γ2
∂φ1
)2
=
(
∂γ1
∂φ1
)2
.
The boundary conditions g0(w0 = 0) = 0 and g1(w1 = 0) = 0 translate to
γ1(φ1 = 0) = 0 and γ1(φ1 = pi/2) = pi/2. Thus∫
Φ
T [φ1,γ,∇γ] dP ∗Φ(φ) ∝
∫ pi/2
0
(
dγ1
dφ1
)2
dφ1
(a)
≥
(∫ pi/2
0
dγ1
dφ1
dφ1
)2
∫ pi/2
0
1 · dφ1
(b)
=
pi
2
where (a) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (b) follows from
the boundary conditions. Equality holds in (a) when
dγ∗1
dφ1
= 1 or γ∗1 = φ1,
which translates to the interleaving attack of (5.3). The maximin value of
the game A(PRDM) = T |γ∗ ≡
(
dγ∗1
dφ1
)2
= 1. By Theorem 5.1 we establish
Corollary 5.3.
Binary Alphabet with Combined Digit Model
We first examine the setup 0 ≤ re,1 = re,2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ rc,1 < (1 − re,1)/2.
Again we fix the uniform distribution dP ∗Φ(φ) ∝ dφ. The payoff function
can be written as
T [φ1,γ,∇γ] =
(
∂R
∂φ1
)2
+R2
(
∂γ1
∂φ1
)2
+
(
∂γ2
∂φ1
)2
=
(
J01
)2
+R2
(
J11
)2
+
(
J21
)2
where we use the notation J ji ,
∂γj
∂φi
interchangeably. The constraints of (2.17)
can be simplified as ge ≤ re,1, g0(w0 = 0) ≤ rc,1 and g1(w1 = 0) ≤ rc,1, which
translate to γ2 ≤ √re,1, γ1(φ1 = 0) ≤ γmax and γ1(φ1 = pi/2) ≥ pi/2 − γmax
where γmax , sin−1
√
rc,1
1−re,1 . Therefore we are interested in the following
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minimization problem:
Minimize
∫ pi/2
0
T [φ1,γ,∇γ] dφ1 (5.28a)
subject to G1[γ] , R2 + γ22 − 1 = 0 and G2[γ] , γ2 −
√
re,1 ≤ 0 (5.28b)
(global constraints)
γ1(φ1 = 0) ≤ γmax and γ1(φ1 = pi/2) ≥ pi/2− γmax (5.28c)
(boundary conditions)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality cannot help us here so we turn to variational
calculus:
(i) Euler-Lagrange Equations: By [42, Sec. 12], if a functional γ(φ1)
minimizes (5.28a), then there exists λ1(φ1) and λ2(φ1) satisfying
∂T
∂γj
+ λ1
∂G1
∂γj
+ λ2
∂G2
∂γj
=
∂
∂φ1
(
∂T
∂J j1
)
, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2. (5.29)
We verify the functional γ(φ1) defined by R ≡
√
1− re,1, γ1 = (1 −
4
pi
γmax)φ1+γmax, and γ2 ≡ √re,1 satisfies (5.29) with λ1 = −
(
1− 4
pi
γmax
)2
and λ2 = −λ1√re,1:4
j = 0 : LHS = 2R
(
J11
)2
+ 2λ1R = 0 =
∂
∂φ1
(2J01 ) = RHS
j = 1 : LHS = 0 =
∂
∂φ1
(2R2J11 ) = RHS
j = 2 : LHS = 2λ1γ2 + 2λ2 = 0 =
∂
∂φ1
= RHS
(ii) Global Constraints: The inequality constraint G2 ≤ 0 is active for
the solution so we need λ2 ≥ 0, which is true since λ1 < 0.
(iii) Boundary Conditions: Both boundary conditions are active for the
solution so we also need ∂T
∂J11
∣∣∣
φ1=0
≥ 0 and ∂T
∂J11
∣∣∣
φ1=pi/2
≥ 0, which can be
verified by ∂T
∂J11
= 2R2J11 > 0 (∵ γmax < pi/4).
The minimizer γ(φ1) translates to (5.5) and the maximin value of the game
is A(PCDM) = T |γ ≡ (1 − re,1)
(
1− 4
pi
sin−1 γmax
)2
. Therefore by Theorem
4LHS stands for left-hand side and RHS stands for right-hand side.
54
5.1 we establish the first part of Theorem 5.2.5
If 0 ≤ re,1 = re,2 ≤ 1 but rc,1 ≥ (1 − re,1)/2, we can let γ be defined
as R ≡ √1− re,1, γ1 ≡ pi/4, and γ2 = √re,1 which yields θ(z) ≡ [(1 −
re,1)/2, (1 − re,1)/2, re,1]′ for all z and T ≡ 0, i.e., this is the case where the
coalition can generate the same distribution of forgery symbols regardless of
what they receive, hence capacity is zero.
One may try to solve the game for the general setup where 0 ≤ re,1 <
re,2 ≤ 1. However, this results in a non-compact collusion class Pc. More
specifically, the constraints (2.17b) alone can be translated to
γ2(φ1 = 0) ≤ √re,1 (5.30a)
γ2(φ1 = pi/2) ≤ √re,1 (5.30b)
γ2(0 < φ1 < pi/2) ≤ √re,2, (5.30c)
which is not a compact space. The minimizer γ(φ1) above fails to satisfy
condition (b) for global constraints, while the conjectured minimizer with γ2
defined by
γ2(φ1) =

√
re,1, φ1 = 0, pi/2
√
re,2, φ1 ∈ (0, pi/2)
does not satisfy the regularity constraint (Condition 5.1).
General Alphabet with Combined Digit Model
Finally we examine the general alphabet case where q ≥ 2. We start with
the case where 0 ≤ re,1 = · · · = re,q ≤ 1 and rc = 0. Let φ˜i =
∏i−1
l=1 sinφl for
1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. We fix the distribution
dP ∗Φ(φ) ∝
q−1∏
i=1
φ˜idφ =
q−1∏
i
(sinφi)
q−i−1dφ (5.31)
5We note that by [43, Chap. 2] we indeed need all (i-iii) to verify the minimizer γ(φ). As
a counter example, the functional γ(φ1) defined by R ≡
√
1− re,1, γ1 = φ1, and γ2 ≡ √re,1
satisfy (a) Euler-Lagrange Equations with λ1 = −1 and λ2 = √re,1 and (b) λ2 > 0, but
we also need (c) ∂T
∂J11
∣∣∣
φ1=0
= 0 for inactive boundary condition γ1(φ1 = 0) < γmax, which
isn’t true.
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which is equivalent to dP ∗W(w) ∝
∏
xw
−1/2
x dw. The payoff function can be
written as
T [φ,γ,∇γ] =
∑
1≤i≤q−1
0≤j≤q
(
γ˜j
φ˜i
· J ji
)2
where
γ˜j =
R
∏j−1
l=1 sin γl, 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1
1, j = 0, q.
(5.32)
The constraints of (2.17) can be simplified as ge ≤ re,1 and gi(wi = 0) = 0
for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, which translates to γq ≤ √re,1 and γi(φi = 0) = 0,
γi(φi = pi/2) = pi/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. Therefore we are interested in the
following minimization problem:
Minimize
∫ pi/2
0
T [φ,γ,∇γ] dP ∗Φ(φ) (5.33a)
subject to G1[γ] , R2 + γ2q − 1 = 0 and G2[γ] , γq −
√
re,1 ≤ 0 (5.33b)
(global constraints)
γi(φi = 0) = 0 and γi(φi = pi/2) = pi/2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1
(5.33c)
(boundary conditions)
The minimizer γ(φ) is given by R ≡ √1− re,1, γq ≡ √re,1, and γi = φi for
1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. Again we verify this solution using variational calculus:
(i) Euler-Lagrange Equations: By [42, Sec. 12] we verify that the
minimizer γ(φ) satisfies
∂
∂γj
(
TdP ∗Φ(φ)
)
+ λ1
∂G1
∂γj
dP ∗Φ(φ) + λ2
∂G2
∂γj
dP ∗Φ(φ)
=
q−1∑
i=1
∂
∂φi
[
∂
∂J ji
(
TdP ∗Φ(φ)
)]
, 0 ≤ j ≤ q. (5.34)
with λ1 = −(q − 1) and λ2 = −2λ1√re,1:
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• j = 0 (γ0 = R): we have
LHS
(a)
=
[ ∑
1≤i,l≤q−1
2
(
J li
)2 · γ˜l
φ˜i
2 ·
∂γ˜l
∂R
]
· dP ∗Φ(φ) + 2λ1R · dP ∗Φ(φ)
(b)
=
(
q−1∑
i=1
2 · γ˜i
φ˜i
2 ·
γ˜i
R
)
· dP ∗Φ(φ) + 2λ1R · dP ∗Φ(φ)
(c)
= 2R(q − 1)dP ∗Φ(φ) + 2λ1R · dP ∗Φ(φ)
(d)
= 0
RHS =
q−1∑
i=1
∂
∂φi
[
2J0i
φ˜i
2 · dP ∗Φ(φ)
]
(e)
= 0
where (a) follows from (5.32), (b) and (e) follows from J li = 1 for
1 ≤ i = j ≤ q − 1 and J li = 0 otherwise, (c) follows from γ˜i = Rφ˜i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, and (d) follows from R = √1− re,1.
• 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1: we have
LHS
(a)
=
[
q−1∑
i=1
q−1∑
l=j+1
2
(
J li
)2 · γ˜l
φ˜i
2 ·
∂γ˜l
∂γj
]
· dP ∗Φ(φ)
(b)
=
[
q−1∑
i=j+1
2 · γ˜i
φ˜i
2 ·
∂γ˜i
∂γj
]
· dP ∗Φ(φ)
(c)
=
[
q−1∑
i=j+1
2 · γ˜i
2
φ˜i
2 · cot γj
]
· dP ∗Φ(φ)
(d)
= 2(q − j − 1)R2 cotφj · dP ∗Φ(φ)
RHS =
q−1∑
i=1
∂
∂φi
[
2J ji ·
γ˜j
2
φ˜i
2 · dP ∗Φ(φ)
]
(e)
=
∂
∂φj
(
2 · γ˜j
2
φ˜j
2 · dP ∗Φ(φ)
)
(f)
=
∂
∂φj
(
2R2 · dP ∗Φ(φ)
)
(g)
= 2R2 · dP ∗Φ(φ) · (q − j − 1) cotφj
where (a) follows from (5.32), (b) and (e) follows from the values
of J li , (c) follows from
∂γ˜i
∂γj
= γ˜i cot γj for i ≥ j + 1, and (d) and
(f) follows from γ˜i = Rφ˜i for 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, and (g) follows from
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(5.31).
• j = q: we have
LHS
(a)
= 2λ1γqdP
∗
Φ(φ) + λ2dP
∗
Φ(φ) = 0
RHS =
q−1∑
i=1
∂
∂φi
[
2Jqi
φ˜i
2 · dP ∗Φ(φ)
]
(b)
= 0
where (a) follows from (5.32) and (b) follows from the values of
Jqi .
(ii) Global Constraints: The inequality constraint G2 ≤ 0 is active for
the solution so we need λ2 ≥ 0, which is true since λ1 < 0.
(iii) Boundary Conditions: All boundary conditions are equalities so
we do not need to verify any other conditions.
The minimizer γ(φ) translates to (5.9) and the maximin value of the game is
A(PCDM) = T |γ ≡ (q − 1)(1− re,1). Therefore by Theorem 5.1 we establish
Theorem 5.4.
For the case where rc is nonzero, unfortunately, a linear function of φ does
not yield a minimizer as in the binary case. We leave this part as future work.
Also similar to the binary case, a general setup where 0 ≤ re,1 < · · · < re,q ≤ 1
yields a non-compact collusion class Pc, which prevents us from finding the
minimizer using variational calculus.
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CHAPTER 6
SECOND-ORDER CODING RATES FOR
MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNELS
In this chapter we study the second-order coding rates of multiple access
channels. In order to follow the conventional notation of MAC, all notation
in this chapter is redefined and is independent of that of digital fingerprinting
in the previous chapters.
6.1 Definitions
Formally, a two-user MAC1 is characterized by a transition distribution
PY|X1X2 where X1 ∈ X n1 , X2 ∈ X n2 , and Y ∈ Yn, and is called discrete memo-
ryless if X1, X2, and Y are finite and PY|X1X2(y|x1,x2) =
∏n
i=1 W (yi|x1i, x2i).
Hence, a DM-MAC is determined by the single-lettered conditional distribu-
tion W (y|x1, x2). An (n,M1,M2) MAC code C consists of two codebooks
{x1(m1)} and {x2(m2)} where mj ∈ {1, . . . ,Mj} , Mj for j = 1, 2 and a
possibly randomized decoder φ(y) = (m̂1, m̂2). Code rates are defined by
Rj , n−1 logMj for j = 1, 2.
The error probability for passing a message pair (m1,m2) using MAC code
C through channel PY|X1X2 is denoted by
Pe(m1,m2, PY|X1X2 , C) ,
∑
y∈Yn
PY|X1X2(y|x1(m1),x2(m2)) Pr{φ(y) 6= (m1,m2)}.
The average error probability is defined by
P avge (PY|X1X2 , C) =
1
M1M2
M1∑
m1=1
M2∑
m2=1
Pe(m1,m2, PY|X1X2 , C)
1Generalizations to k-user MAC for k ≥ 3 are straightforward and thus omitted.
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and the maximal error probability is defined by
Pmaxe (PY|X1X2 , C) = max
(m1,m2)∈M1×M2
Pe(m1,m2, PY|X1X2 , C).
An (n,M1,M2, ) MAC code C under average (resp. maximal) error prob-
ability satisfies P avge (PY|X1X2 , C) ≤  (resp. Pmaxe (PY|X1X2 , C) ≤ ). A rate
pair (R1, R2) is (n, )-achievable under average (resp. maximal) error proba-
bility if there exists an (n,M1,M2, ) MAC code such that logM1 ≥ R1 and
logM2 ≥ R2 under average (resp. maximal) error probability.
The capacity region of a DM-MAC W is closely related to statistics of the
information density vector i(U,X1, X2,W ) abbreviated by i (should there be
no risk of confusion) and defined by
i(U,X1, X2,W ) =
i(X1;Y |X2, U)i(X2;Y |X1, U)
i(X1, X2;Y |U)
 =

log W (Y |X1,X2)
P (Y |X2,U)
log W (Y |X1,X2)
P (Y |X1,U)
log W (Y |X1,X2)
P (Y |U)

where U is an auxiliary “time sharing” random variable and U ↔ (X1, X2)↔
Y forms a Markov chain, i.e.,
PUX1X2Y = PUPX1X2|UW.
The marginal distributions P (Y |X1, U), P (Y |X2, U) and P (Y |U) are ob-
tained by marginalizing out X2, X1, and (X1, X2), respectively. The mutual
information vector I(PUX1X2 ,W ) or I is defined by the expectation of the
information density vector under PUX1X2W :
I(PUX1X2 ,W ) , E [i(U,X1, X2,W )] =
I(X1;Y |X2, U)I(X2;Y |X1, U)
I(X1, X2;Y |U)
 . (6.1)
The (n, )-capacity region Ravgn, (resp. Rmaxn, ) under average (resp. maxi-
mal) error probability is defined by the set of all (n, )-achievable rate pairs.
For the DM-MAC, as ↘ 0 and n→∞, Ravgn, approaches the MAC capacity
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region by Ahlswede [15] and Liao [16]:
C(W ) =
⋃
PUPX1|UPX2|U
R(PUPX1|UPX2|U) (6.2)
where R(PUPX1|UPX2|U) is the set of all rate pairs [R1, R2]′ satisfying
R ≤ I(PUX1X2 ,W ). (6.3)
The rate vector is defined by R = [R1, R2, R1+R2]
′ and the inequality denotes
element-wise inequality. The strong converse by Dueck [18], later sharpened
by Ahlswede [19], stated that every sequence of (n,M1,M2, ) MAC codes
(average error probability) satisfies
[logM1, logM2]
′ ∈ nC(W ) +O (√n log n) . (6.4)
It should be noted that whileRmaxn, is in general smaller thanRavgn, even in the
first-order term [17], they do coincide if encoder randomization is allowed.2
The following notation will be used throughout the chapter: given a se-
quence of vectors an, a sequence of regions Fn, and a sequence of functions
gn, the asymptotic notation an ∈ Fn +O(gn) means there exists a constant c
such that an ∈ Fn + cgn1 for sufficiently large n. Here 1 denotes the vector
comprised of all ones, and ‘+’ denotes Minkowski set addition.
6.2 Main Results
The main goal of this work is to provide sharp inner and outer bounds on
DM-MAC second-order coding rates. Our bounds are associated with the
following quantities:
Under PUX1X2W , we define the dispersion matrix V(PUX1X2 ,W ) as
V(PUX1X2 ,W ) , EPU
{
CovPX1X2|UW [i(U,X1, X2,W )|U ]
}
. (6.5)
Let X be a d-dimensional Gaussian vector with mean 0 and covariance
2In particular, randomized permutation of codeword assignments equalizes the decoding
error probability for all possible message pairs.
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Figure 6.1: The region Qinv(Σ, ) for Σ =
[
1 .3
.3 1
]
and  = .3.
matrix Σ. For any  ∈ (0, 1) let
Qinv(Σ, ) ,
{
x ∈ Rd : Pr(X ≤ x) ≥ 1− } (6.6a)
=
{
x ∈ Rd : Pr(X ≥ −x) ≥ 1− } . (6.6b)
Note that for d = 1, we have Qinv(σ2, ) = {z ≥ σQ−1()} where Q−1 is the
complementary Gaussian cumulative distribution function. An example of a
two-dimensional Qinv region is shown in Fig. 6.1.
Fix distributions P and {Qj}3j=1 we consider the ternary composite hy-
pothesis testing (HT) problem:
H0 : Y ∼ Qj, j = 1, 2, 3
H1 : Y ∼ P.
A randomized hypothesis test is denoted by δ(y) = Pr(Say H1|Y = y), y ∈ Y .
Definition 6.1. 3 The ternary hypothesis testing performance region E is
defined as the set of achievable false positive vectors for power (1− ) tests:
E
(
P,
{
Qj
}3
j=1
)
,
{
[e1, e2, e3]
′ : ∃test δ s.t.
EP [δ(Y )] ≥ 1−  and EQj [δ(Y )] ≤ ej, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
}
.
This is a generalization of the binary hypothesis testing performance func-
3Note that the definition is different from that of our ISIT paper [7].
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tion βα of [9, (100)], which can also be written as:
βα(P,Q) = min {′ : ∃test δ s.t. EP [δ(Y )] ≥ α and EQ [δ(Y )] ≤ ′} .
Our inner bound characterize the asymptotics of the (n, )-capacity region
Ravgn, under the average error probability criterion of DM-MAC up to the
O
(
logn
n
)
term. The characterization utilizes the mutual information vector
of (6.1), the second-order dispersion matrix V of (6.5), and the Qinv region
of (6.6).
Theorem 6.1. For any fixed distribution PUX1X2 let
Rinn,(PUX1X2 ,W ) , I(PUX1X2 ,W )−
1√
n
Qinv(V(PUX1X2 ,W ), )
and
Rinn,(W ) , ∪PUPX1|UPX2|URinn,(PUX1X2 ,W ). (6.7)
Then for sufficiently large n any rate vector R ∈ Rinn,(W ) + O
(
logn
n
)
is
(n, )-achievable (average error probability).
Our single-lettered outer bounds are based on the following general outer
regions for discrete MAC (not necessarily memoryless). We say C ′ an (n,Ω, )
MAC subcode of C under maximal error probability if ∀(m1,m2) ∈ Ω ⊆
M1 ×M2 we have Pe(m1,m2, PY|X1X2 , C) ≤ .
Theorem 6.2. Let C be an (n,M1,M2, ) MAC code (maximal error proba-
bility) and let Ω be a subset of the set of message pairs M1 ×M2. Then
|Ω| ≤ inf
QY
max
(x1,x2)∈C(Ω)
[
β1−(PY|X1=x1,X2=x2 , QY)
]−1
(6.8)
where QY ranges over all distributions on Yn.
Theorem 6.3. Given an (n,Ω, ) MAC subcode C ′ (maximal error proba-
bility) of C for channel PY|X1X2, a subset Ω of Ω such that |Ω| ≥ |Ω| ≥
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3 max {M1,M2}. Then we have[
3M2
|Ω| ,
3M1
|Ω| ,
3
|Ω|
]
∈
⋂
Q1
Y|X2 ,Q
2
Y|X1 ,Q
3
Y
⋃
(x1,x2)∈C(Ω)
E
(
PY|X1=x1,X2=x2 ,
{
Q1Y|X2=x2 , Q
2
Y|X1=x1 , Q
3
Y
})
where Q1Y|X2, Q
2
Y|X1, and Q
3
Y range over all distributions on Yn.
6.3 Inner Region
In this section, we prove the characterization of the asymptotic inner bound
of Theorem 6.1 for the (n, )-capacity region Ravgn, under the average er-
ror probability criterion of DM-MAC. For any fixed distribution PUX1X2 =
PUPX1|UPX2|U , we consider the following random codes:
Encoder: Let {ui}ni=1, n ≥ 1 be deterministic sequences such that for large
enough n the empirical distribution PˆU(u) , 1n
∑n
i=1 1{ui=u} approaches
PU(u) in O(1/n), i.e.,
‖PˆU − PU‖1 = O(1/n) (6.9)
where ‖·‖1 denotes the L1 norm. For each message pair (m1,m2) ∈M1×M2,
draw Xji independently from PXj |U(·|ui) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j = 1, 2.
Decoder: Define the (variable-size) list L of all messages (m1,m2) whose
score exceeds a prescribed threshold vector τ n = [τ1,n, τ2,n, τ3,n]
′:
L , {(m1,m2) ∈M1 ×M2 : Z(m1,m2) ≥ τ n}
where Z(m1,m2) ,
∑n
i=1 Zi(m1,m2) and
Zi(m1,m2) = i(ui, X1i(m1), X2i(m2),W ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (6.10)
Analysis of the threshold decoding scheme is based on a generalized multi-
dimensional Berry-Esseen theorem [44], which approximates the distribution
of the sum of independent random vectors to a multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution, and large deviations analysis.
Without loss of generality, we assume m1 = m2 = 1. The analysis below
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shows that there exists a threshold vector τ n such that
Pr(L = ∅) ≤ − αn (6.11)
Pr(∃ [(m′1,m′2) 6= (1, 1)] ∈ L) ≤ αn (6.12)
for some αn = O(n
−1/2). Now Z(1, 1) of (6.10) is a sum of independent (but
not identically distributed) random vectors. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n we let
Ci = E[i(ui, X1i(1), X2i(1),W )]
and
Σi = Cov (i(ui, X1i(1), X2i(1),W ))
and therefore
Cn ,
1
n
E[Z(1, 1)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ci
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[i(ui, X1i(1), X2i(1),W )]
=
∑
u
PˆU(u)E[i(u,X1, X2,W )]
= I(PˆUPX1|UPX2|U ,W ) (6.13)
and
Σn ,
1
n
Cov(Z(1, 1)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Σi
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Cov (i(ui, X1i(1), X2i(1),W ))
=
∑
u
PˆU(u)Cov (i(u,X1, X2,W ))
= V(PˆUPX1|UPX2|U ,W ) (6.14)
(both linear functions of PˆU). We apply Theorem B.2 by letting Si = Zi−Ci.
By (6.13) and (6.14) we have E[Si] = 0 and M = Cov(S) = nΣn. Here we
assume that V(PUPX1|UPX2|U ,W ) > 0. By Lemma B.1 we have λmin(Σn) > 0
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for sufficiently large n and thus we have
βi = E[‖M−1/2Si‖32] ≤ E
[∣∣λmax(M−1/2)∣∣3 ‖Si‖32]
= n−3/2
[
λmin(Σn)
]−3/2
E[‖Si‖32]
and therefore
β =
n∑
i=1
βi ≤ 1√
n
[
λmin(Σn)
]−3/2
T n (6.15)
where T n , 1n
∑n
i=1 E[‖Zi −Ci‖32] which is bounded for DM-MAC. If we let
γn ,
c
[
λmin(Σn)
]−3/2
T n√
n
= O
(
1√
n
)
(6.16)
(where c is the constant defined in Theorem B.2) and
A =
{
S ∈ R3 : S ≥ τ n − nCn
}
,
then we have
Pr{S ∈ A} = P{∑ni=1 Si ≥ τ n − nCn} = Pr{Z ≥ τ n}
Pr{X ∈ A} = Pr{X ≥ τ n − nCn}
and thus by Theorem B.2, (6.15), and (6.16) we have
∣∣P{Z ≥ τ n} − Pr{X ≥ τ n − nCn}∣∣ ≤ ∆(S) ≤ cβ ≤ γn. (6.17)
We now pick τ n arbitrarily from
nCn −
√
nQinv(Σn, − αn − γn).
Then by the definition (6.6) of Qinv we have
Pr(Z ≥ τ n) ≥ Pr
{
X ≥ τ n − nCn
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1−+αn+γn
−γn ≥ 1− + αn
and therefore (6.11) is satisfied. On the other hand, using large deviations
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analysis we obtain
Pr(∃((m′1 6= 1), 1) ∈ L) ≤M1 exp {−τ1,n +O (1)}
Pr(∃(1, (m′2 6= 1)) ∈ L) ≤M2 exp {−τ2,n +O (1)}
Pr(∃((m′1 6= 1), (m′2 6= 2)) ∈ L)
≤M1M2 exp {−τ3,n +O (1)} .
Therefore (6.12) is satisfied if
[R1, R2, R1 +R2]
′ ∈ τ n
n
−O
(
log n
n
)
.
Finally, by combining ‖Cn − I(PUX1X2 ,W )‖1 = O(1/n) and
‖Σn −V(PUX1X2 ,W )‖1 = O(1/n) (which can be shown using (6.9)) and the
fact that PUX1X2 and τ n are arbitrary, we prove the theorem for the case
V(PUPX1|UPX2|U ,W ) > 0.
Now we consider the case where V(PUPX1|UPX2|U ,W ) is singular but p =
rank(V(PUPX1|UPX2|U ,W )) ≥ 1. In this case we can find a transformation
matrix T ∈ Rp×3 and analyze the statistics of Z˜ = TZ. The covariance
matrix of Z˜ is non-singular and we can follow the same lines of proof. If
V(PUPX1|UPX2|U ,W ) = 0, then Σn = O
(
1
n
)
so the above analysis still holds.
6.4 Outer Region
We provide general outer regions for discrete multiple access channels (not
necessarily memoryless), for both average and maximal error probability cri-
teria. The results can be regarded as generalizations of the general converses
for single-user channels in [9].
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6.4.1 Average Error Probability
Theorem 6.4. For any four channels PY|X1X2 and
{
QjX1X2Y
}3
j=1
and a MAC
code C, let
 = avg. error prob. with PY|X1X2
′j = avg. error prob. with Q
j
Y|X1X2 , j = 1, 2, 3
PX1X2 = PX1PX2 = Q
j
X1X2
= encoder output
distribution with indep. equiprobable codewords.
Then we have
[1− ′1, 1− ′2, 1− ′3] ∈ E
(
PX1X2Y,
{
QjX1X2Y
}3
j=1
)
.
Proof. This is a generalization of [9, Theorem 26]. Consider the following test
δ for deciding between P and {Qj}: denote the observed pair by (x1,x2,y); y
is fed into the decoder and the test declares P if the message is decoded cor-
rectly. The probability that the test is correct if P is the actual distribution
is EP [δ(X1,X2,Y)] = 1−, and the probability that the test is incorrect if Qj
is the actual distribution is EQj [δ(X1,X2,Y)] = 1− ′j, j = 1, 2, 3. Therefore
the error vector [1− ′1, 1− ′2, 1− ′3]′ is achievable.
Theorem 6.5. Every (n,M1,M2, ) MAC code (average error probability)
satisfies
[1/M1, 1/M2, 1/M1M2]
′ ∈
⋃
PX1X2
⋂
Q1
Y|X2 ,Q
2
Y|X1 ,Q
3
Y
E
(
PX1X2 × PY|X1X2 ,
{
PX1X2 ×Q1Y|X2 , PX1X2 ×Q2Y|X1 , PX1X2 ×Q3Y
})
(6.18)
where Q1Y|X2, Q
2
Y|X1, and Q
3
Y range over all distributions on Yn.
Proof. By particularizing Q1Y|X1X2 in Theorem 6.4 to be independent of X1,
the error probability ′1 is at least 1−1/M1. Similarly we have ′2 ≥ 1−1/M2
and ′3 ≥ 1− 1/M1M2. Hence the theorem.
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6.4.2 Maximal Error Probability
Theorem 6.6. For any two channels PY|X1X2 and QY|X1X2, a MAC code C,
and a subset Ω of the set of message pairs M1 ×M2, let
Ω = max
(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pe(m1,m2, PY|X1X2)
′Ω = max
(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pe(m1,m2, QY|X1X2).
Then
min
(x1,x2)∈C(Ω)
β1−Ω(PY|X1=x1,X2=x2 , QY|X1=x1,X2=x2) ≤ 1− ′Ω.
Proof. Let (m∗1,m
∗
2) ∈ Ω be the message pair with Pe(m∗1,m∗2, QY|X1X2) =
′Ω. Consider the test δ for deciding between PY|X1=x1(m∗1),X2=x2(m∗2) and
QY|X1=x1(m∗1),X2=x2(m∗2) that declares P if the message is decoded correctly.
The probability that the test is correct if P is the actual distribution is
EP [δ(x1(m
∗
1),x2(m
∗
2),Y)] ≥ 1 − Ω, and the probability that the test is in-
correct if Q is the actual distribution is EQ[δ(x1(m
∗
1),x2(m
∗
2),Y)] = 1 − ′Ω.
Therefore
β1−Ω(PY|X1=x1(m∗1),X2=x2(m∗2),
QY|X1=x1(m∗1),X2=x2(m∗2)) ≤ 1− ′Ω.
By particularizing QY|X1X2 in Theorem 6.6 independent of X1 and X2,
the maximal error probability ′Ω is at least 1 − 1/|Ω|. Also Ω is trivially
upper-bounded by . Therefore Theorem 6.2 follows.
Theorem 6.7. Given an (n,Ω, ) MAC subcode (maximal error probability)
of C for channel PY|X1X2, a subset Ω of Ω, and three arbitrary MAC channels
QjY|X1X2 , j = 1, 2, 3. Then for any (m1,m2) ∈ Ω, we have1− Pe(m1,m2, Q
1
Y|X1X2 , C)
1− Pe(m1,m2, Q2Y|X1X2 , C)
1− Pe(m1,m2, Q3Y|X1X2 , C)

∈
⋃
(x1,x2)∈C(Ω)
E
(
PY|X1=x1,X2=x2 ,
{
QjY|X1=x1,X2=x2
}3
j=1
)
. (6.19)
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Proof. Consider the test δ for deciding between PY|X1=x1(m1),X2=x2(m2) and{
QjY|X1=x1(m1),X2=x2(m2)
}3
j=1
that declares P if the message pair is decoded
correctly. The probability that the test is correct if P is the actual distribu-
tion is
EP [δ(x1(m1),x2(m2),Y)] = 1− Pe(m1,m2, PY|X1X2 , C) ≥ 1− ,
and the probability that the test is incorrect if Qj for j = 1, 2, 3 is the actual
distribution is
EQj [δ(x1(m1),x2(m2),Y)] = 1− Pe(m1,m2, QjY|X1X2 , C).
Thus by the definition of E we have1− Pe(m1,m2, Q
1
Y|X1X2 , C)
1− Pe(m1,m2, Q2Y|X1X2 , C)
1− Pe(m1,m2, Q3Y|X1X2 , C)

∈ E
(
PY|X1=x1(m1),X2=x2(m2),
{
QjY|X1=x1(m1),X2=x2(m2)
}3
j=1
)
and therefore (6.19) is proved.
Theorem 6.3 can be shown by applying Theorem 6.7. Using the fact that
Q3Y is independent of X1 and X2, we have∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pe(m1,m2, Q
3
Y, C) =
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω
∑
y∈Yn
Q3Y(y) Pr{φ(y) 6= (m1,m2)}
=
∑
y∈Yn
Q3Y(y)
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pr{φ(y) 6= (m1,m2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥|Ω|−1
≥ |Ω| − 1.
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Similarly we have∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pe(m1,m2, Q
1
Y|X2 , C)
=
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω
∑
y∈Yn
Q1Y|X2(y|x2(m2)) Pr{φ(y) 6= (m1,m2)}
=
∑
m2∈M2
∑
y∈Yn
Q1Y|X2(y|x2(m2))
∑
m1:(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pr{φ(y) 6= (m1,m2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥N1(m2)−1
≥
∑
m2∈M2
[N1(m2)− 1]
∑
y∈Yn
Q1Y|X2(y|x2(m2))
= |Ω| −M2
where N1(m2) , |{m1 : (m1,m2) ∈ Ω}| is the number of message pairs in Ω
whose second message is m2. In sum, we have
|Ω| −M2 ≤
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω Pe(m1,m2, Q
1
Y|X2 , C) ≤ |Ω| (6.20)
|Ω| −M1 ≤
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω Pe(m1,m2, Q
2
Y|X1 , C) ≤ |Ω| (6.21)
|Ω| − 1 ≤∑(m1,m2)∈Ω Pe(m1,m2, Q3Y, C) ≤ |Ω|. (6.22)
Now if we can find a message pair (m1,m2) ∈ Ω such that
Pe(m1,m2, Q
1
Y|X2 , C) ≥ 1−
3M2
|Ω| , 
′
1 (6.23)
Pe(m1,m2, Q
2
Y|X1 , C) ≥ 1−
3M1
|Ω| , 
′
2 (6.24)
Pe(m1,m2, Q
3
Y, C) ≥ 1−
3
|Ω| , 
′
3, (6.25)
where ′1, 
′
2, 
′
3 ∈ (0, 1) then by substituting (6.23)-(6.25) into (6.19) we can
prove the theorem. |Ω| ≥ |Ω| ≥ 3 max {M1,M2}
Suppose not, i.e., for any (m1,m2) ∈ Ω at least one of the three inequalities
among (6.23)-(6.25) into (6.19) is not satisfied. Let
Sj ,
{
(m1,m2) : Pe(m1,m2, Q
j, C) < ′j
}
, j = 1, 2, 3.
Since every message pair (m1,m2) ∈ Ω belongs to at least one of the Sj’s,
71
there exists j∗ ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that |Sj∗| ≥ |Ω|3 . Then we have∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω
Pe(m1,m2, Q
j∗ , C)
=
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω∩Sj∗
Pe(m1,m2, Q
j∗ , C) +
∑
(m1,m2)∈Ω\Sj∗
Pe(m1,m2, Q
j∗ , C)
< |Sj∗| · ′j∗ + (|Ω| − |Sj∗|) · 1
= |Ω| − |Sj∗| (1− ′j∗)
≤ |Ω| − |Ω|
3
(
1− ′j∗
)
= |Ω|
[
1− 1
3
(
1− ′j∗
)]
=

|Ω| −M2 j∗ = 1
|Ω| −M1 j∗ = 2
|Ω| − 1 j∗ = 3,
which contradicts with (6.20), (6.21), or (6.22). Finally, |Ω| ≥ 3 max {M1,M2}
ensures that ′1, 
′
2, 
′
3 ∈ (0, 1) and therefore Theorem 6.3 follows.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we focus on characterizing the asymptotics of two multi-user
channels. The fingerprinting channel is associated with the technology of
digital fingerprinting, which is an active topic in the area of information
forensics and security. The multiple access channel is one of the most funda-
mental building blocks of communication systems. The asymptotic analyses
study the fundamental limits as the sizes of the problems become intractable.
7.1 Digital Fingerprinting
The difficulty of analyzing fingerprinting capacity games stems from the un-
certainty of pirates’ attack. As the number k of pirates grows, their attack
can be more powerful. Moreover, as shown in Chap. 4 and Chap. 5, the
game is already unmanageable even when k is in single digits. Therefore
it is crucial to study the large-coalition fingerprinting games. In Chap. 4
we study the asymptotics of fingerprinting games for the binary alphabets
under the marking assumption, and the results are generalized to arbitrary
alphabets under the combined digit model in Chap. 5. We show that capac-
ity is asymptotic to A/k2 where the constant A is explicitly specified. The
asymptotic optimal strategies of the fingerprinting capacity game are also
obtained.
The capacity game results are mostly negative. The quadratic decay of ca-
pacity suggests that it is fundamentally impossible to construct an efficient
fingerprinting code that is robust to large-coalition attacks. Furthermore,
the capacity values under the marking assumption derived in previous work
are too optimistic and are about 20-30% less under CDM. However, the fact
that the simple capacity game is asymptotically the same as the joint capac-
ity game suggests a positive result: One can essentially achieve the maximum
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achievable rate with computationally feasible codes. Along this line of work
one interesting problem to explore is how to design an effective fingerprint-
ing code that approaches capacity. Tardos’ construction [4] and its q-ary
alphabet generalization [23] already achieved the same 1/k2 rate as capacity,
but how to achieve or approach the same constant factor A remains an open
problem. A recent work by Oosterwijk et al. [45] shed light on how our theo-
retical capacity results are indeed in align with practical fingerprinting code
construction: They improved upon their earlier construction [23] by changing
the distribution of the time-sharing variable W from dPW(w) ∝
∏
xw
−1/q
x dw
to dP ∗W(w) ∝
∏
xw
−1/2
x dw, and by tailoring the so-called “suspicion func-
tion” against the interleaving attack. This matches exactly our maximizing
and minimizing strategies for the asymptotic fingerprinting game under RDM
(Corollary 5.5)! Therefore, we believe that, by studying the asymptotic ca-
pacity game for the general model of CDM, one can construct an efficient
fingerprinting code against practical collusion attacks.
7.2 Multiple Access Channel
The study of second-order channel coding rate, initiated by Strassen [8] in
1962 and recently revisited by Polyanskiy et al. [9] and Hayashi [10], has
become one of the most active areas of research in information theory. The
characterization of second-order coding rates for multiple access channels is
studied in many recent literatures [11, 12, 7, 13, 14, 20], but it remains an
open problem.
Our characterization of inner region for the discrete memoryless MAC has
been the tightest bound in the literature until Scarlett et al.’s very recent
work [20]. On the other hand, there has not been any significant progress
on the outer region for discrete memoryless MAC other than some trivial
bounds that can be derived from single-user channels [11]. We believe our
general outer region bounds can be extended to tight single-lettered outer
bound. Such extension, however, requires strong large deviation analysis for
composite hypothesis problems.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR FINGERPRINTING
CAPACITY
A.1 Derivation of Csimplek,2 (PW ,p∗)
The function Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗) is indeed symmetric around w = 1/2 and has a
global maximum at w = 1/2 as suggested by numerical experiments in [22].
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. For r ≥ s ≥ 0 and r + s ≤ 1, we have
d2(r ‖ s) ≥ d2(s ‖ r). (A.1)
Proof. The difference δ(r, s) between the two sides is
δ(r, s) = d2(r ‖ s)− d2(s ‖ r)
= r log2
r
s
+ (1− r) log2
1− r
1− s − s log2
s
r
− (1− s) log2
1− s
1− r
= (r + s) log2
r
s
+ (2− r − s) log2
1− r
1− s. (A.2)
Then
∂
∂s
δ(r, s) =
s− r
s(1− s) ln 2 + log2
r(1− s)
s(1− r) (A.3)
and
∂2
∂s2
δ(r, s) =
(r − s)(1− 2s)
s2(1− s)2 ln 2 ≥ 0 (A.4)
for all r ≥ s and r + s ≤ 1. Now when s ≤ r ≤ 1/2, we have ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣
s=r
=
δ(r, r) = 0. Thus ∂
∂s
δ(r, s) ≤ 0 and thus δ(r, s) ≥ 0. When 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1− s,
we have ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣
s=1−r ≤ 0 and δ(r, 1− r) = 0. Hence similarly ∂∂sδ(r, s) ≤ 0
and hence δ(r, s) ≥ 0. To prove the inequality ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣
s=1−r ≤ 0, let
λ(r) , ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣∣∣
s=1−r
=
1− 2r
r(1− r) ln 2 + 2 log2
r
1− r
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and since λ(1/2) = 0 and λ′(r) = − (1−2r)2
r2(1−r)2 ln 2 ≤ 0 it follows that λ(r) ≤ 0
for all r ∈ [1/2, 1].
Now the payoff function can be written as
Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗)
(a)
= wd2(α
1′p∗ ‖ α′p∗) + (1− w)d2(α0′p∗ ‖ α′p∗)
(b)
= wd2(w +
1− w
k
‖ w) + (1− w)d2(w − w
k
‖ w) (A.5)
where (a) follows from (4.13) and (b) follows from (4.6) and Lemma 4.2,
and by which we can easily verify the symmetry property Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗) =
Isimplek,2 (1−w,p∗). Hence it suffices to show that Isimplek,2 (w,p∗) is nondecreasing
for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1/2. Taking the derivative of (A.5) with respect to w and after
some simplifications, we obtain
∂
∂w
Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗) = d2(w+ ‖ w−)− d2(w− ‖ w+) (A.6)
where w+ , w + 1−w
k
and w− , w − w
k
. By Lemma A.1 it follows that
∂
∂w
Isimplek,2 (w,p
∗) ≥ 0 for all w ∈ [0, 1/2] and hence Isimplek,2 (w,p∗) achieves its
maximum at w = 1/2.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.6
By the definitions in Chap. 2, the conditional distribution of Z given w
follows the multinomial law with parameter w and k trials. We denote the
probability mass functions by
αz(w) , pZ|W(z|w) =
(
k
z
) q−1∏
x=0
wzxx (A.7)
for z ∈ Z and w ∈ Wq where (k
z
)
is the multinomial coefficient defined by(
k
z
)
= k!
z0!z1!···zq−1! . Let α(w) = [αz1(w), . . . , αzt(w)]
′ be a length-t probability
vector. Similarly
αxz(w) , pZ|X1W(z|x,w) =
(
k − 1
z− ex
) q−1∏
l=0
wzl−δxll (A.8)
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for x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, and w ∈ Wq where ex is the unit vector with the x-th
coordinate equals to one. We have the following moments of Z:
E[Z|W = w] = kw (A.9)
Cov(Z|W = w) = k(diag(w)−ww′) (A.10)
E
[‖Z− kW‖32 |W = w] = O(k) (A.11)
E[Z|W = w, X1 = x] = ex + (k − 1)w (A.12)
Cov(Z|W = w, X1 = x) = (k − 1)(diag(w)−ww′)
(A.13)
E
[‖Z− ex − (k − 1)w‖32 |W = w, X1 = x] = O(k) (A.14)
The following lemmas will be useful for our analysis:
Lemma A.2. [33, Sec. 2.5]
Dq(f ‖ g) = 1
2 ln q
∑
i
(fi − gi)2
gi
+O
(‖f − g‖32) (A.15)
as ‖f − g‖2 → 0, where f and g are probability vectors.
Lemma A.3. For Z following the multinomial law with parameters w and
k trials, we have
Pr
[
‖Z− kw‖2 ≥ q
√
k ln k
]
= O
(
1
k2
)
. (A.16)
Proof. We have
Pr
[
‖Z− kw‖2 ≥ q
√
k ln k
]
≤ Pr
[
∃x ∈ Q : |Zx − kwx| ≥
√
k ln k
]
(a)
≤
∑
x∈Q
Pr
[
|Zx − kwx| ≥
√
k ln k
] (b)
≤ 2q
k2
where (a) follows from the union bound and (b) follows from Hoeffding’s
inequality (see [34]).
To prove Theorem 5.6, we first rewrite the mutual information of the payoff
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functions as
I jointk,q (w,Θ) ,
1
k
I(Z;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
∑
z
pZ|W(z|w)
∑
y
pY |Z,W(y|z,w) logq
pY |Z,W(y|z,w)
pY |W(y|w)
(a)
=
1
k
∑
z
αz(w)
∑
y
θy(z) logq
θy(z)
(Θα)y
=
1
k
∑
z
αz(w)Dq(θ(z) ‖ Θα) (A.17)
where (a) follows from (2.16) and (A.7), and
Isimplek,q (w,Θ) , I(X1;Y |W = w)
=
∑
x∈Q
pX1|W(x|w)
∑
y
pY |X1,W(y|x,w) logq
pY |X1,W(y|x,w)
pY |W(y|w)
(a)
=
∑
x∈Q
wx
∑
y
(Θαx)y logq
(Θαx)y
(Θα)y
=
∑
x
wxDq(Θα
x ‖ Θα). (A.18)
where (a) follows from (2.1) and (A.8). By Condition 5.1 and Taylor’s The-
orem, we have for each y ∈ Y ,
θy(z) = gy
(
1
k
z
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w) (z− kw) + 1
2k2
(z− kw)′∇2gy(w) (z− kw)
+O
(
1
k3
‖z− kw‖32
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
(A.19)
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as k →∞, where ∇2gy is the q-by-q Hessian matrix. Therefore
(Θα)y = E [θy(Z)|W = w]
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w)E [Z− kW|W = w]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
= 0
+
1
2k2
E
[
(Z− kW)′∇2gy(w) (Z− kW) |W = w
]
+O
(
1
k3
E
[‖Z− kW‖32 |W = w])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
=O(1/k2)
+o
(
1
k
)
= gy(w) +
1
2k2
tr
[∇2gy(w)Cov (Z|W = w)]+ o(1
k
)
(c)
= gy(w) +
1
2k
tr
[∇2gy(w) (diag(w)−ww′)]+ o(1
k
)
(A.20)
where (a), (b), and (c) follows from (A.9), (A.11), and (A.10) respectively,
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and
(Θαx)y
= E [θy(Z)|W = w, X1 = x]
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w)E [Z− kW|W = w, X1 = x]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
= ex−w
+
1
2k2
E
[
(Z− kW)′∇2gy(W) (Z− kW) |W = w, X1 = x
]
+O
(
1
k3
E
[‖(Z− ex − (k − 1)w) + ex −w‖32 |W = w, X1 = x])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
=O(1/k2)
+o
(
1
k
)
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w)(ex −w)
+
1
2k2
tr
{∇2gy(w)E [(Z− kw) (Z− kw)′ |W = w, X1 = x]}+ o(1
k
)
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w)(ex −w)
+
1
2k2
tr
{∇2gy(w) [Cov(Z|W = w, X1 = x) + (ex −w)(ex −w)′]}+ o(1
k
)
(c)
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w)(ex −w) + k − 1
2k2
tr
[∇2gy(w)(diag(w)−ww′)]+ o(1
k
)
= gy(w) +
1
k
∇gy(w)(ex −w) + 1
2k
tr
[∇2gy(w) (diag(w)−ww′)]+ o(1
k
)
(A.21)
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from (A.12), (A.14), and (A.13) respectively.
Now we have
I jointk,q (w,Θ) =
1
k
∑
z
αz(w)Dq(θ(z) ‖ Θα)
(a)∼ 1
k
∑
z:‖z−kw‖2≤q
√
k ln k
αz(w)Dq(θ(z) ‖ Θα) (A.22)
where (a) follows from Lemma A.3. If we let z = kw + η where η =
O(
√
k ln k), then combining (A.19) and (A.20) yields
θy(z)− (Θα)y = 1
k
∇gy(w)η +O
(
ln k
k
)
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for η = ω(1). The contributions to (A.22) for η = O(1) decays exponentially
with k and thus can be neglected. Hence we have
I jointk,q (w,Θ) ∼
1
k
∑
z:‖z−kw‖2≤q
√
k ln k
αz(w)Dq(θ(z) ‖ Θα)
(a)∼ 1
k
∑
z:‖z−kw‖2≤q
√
k ln k
αz(w) · 1
2 ln q
∑
y
[
1
k
∇gy(w)(z− kw)
]2
gy(w)
=
1
2k3 ln q
∑
y
1
gy(w)
∑
z:‖z−kw‖2≤q
√
k ln k
αz(w) [∇gy(w)(z− kw)]2
(b)∼ 1
2k3 ln q
∑
y
1
gy(w)
∑
z
αz(w) [∇gy(w)(z− kw)]2
=
1
2k3 ln q
∑
y
∇gy(w)Cov(Z|W = w)∇′gy(w)
gy(w)
(c)
=
1
2k2 ln q
∑
y
∇gy(w) [diag(w)−ww′]∇′gy(w)
gy(w)
(A.23)
where (a) follows from Lemma A.2, (b) follows from Lemma A.3, and (c)
follows from (A.10).
The derivation of Isimplek,q (w,Θ) is simpler:
Isimplek,q (w,Θ) =
∑
x
wxDq(Θα
x ‖ Θα)
(a)∼ 1
2 ln q
∑
x
wx
∑
y
[(Θαx)y − (Θα)y]2
(Θα)y
(b)∼ 1
2k2 ln q
∑
x
wx
∑
y
[∇gy(w)(ex −w)]2
gy(w)
=
1
2k2 ln q
∑
y
1
gy(w)
∇gy(w)
[∑
x
wx(ex −w)(ex −w)′
]
∇′gy(w)
=
1
2k2 ln q
∑
y
∇gy(w) [diag(w)−ww′]∇′gy(w)
gy(w)
(A.24)
as k → ∞, where (a) follows from Lemma A.2 and (b) follows from (A.21)
and (A.20).
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A.3 Useful Lemmas for Change of Variable in Sec.
5.2.2
The following lemma follows directly from the definitions of (5.18), (5.19),
(5.20), and (5.21):
Lemma A.4. We have
‖vq−1i ‖2 =
r, i = 0vi−1 tanφi, 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1 (A.25)
= r
i∏
l=1
sinφl, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1 (A.26)
‖hq−1j ‖2 =
R, j = 0hj−1 tan γj, 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1 (A.27)
= R
j∏
l=1
sin γl, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1. (A.28)
Lemma A.5. By the definition of (5.18), (5.19), (5.20), and (5.21) we have(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ
= diag
(
1, R2, R2 sin2 γ1, R
2 sin2 γ1 sin
2 γ2, · · · , R2
q−2∏
l=1
sin2 γl, 1
)
(A.29a)
Jφv
(
Jφv
)′
= diag
(
1, r−2, r−2 sin−2 φ1, r−2 sin−2 φ1 sin−2 φ2, · · · , r−2
q−2∏
l=1
sin−2 φl
)
(A.29b)
Jφv vv
′
(
Jφv
)′
= diag(r2, 0, · · · , 0). (A.29c)
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Proof. By (5.21) we have
Jhγ =

h0/R −h0 tan γ1 0 · · · 0 0
h1/R h1 cot γ1 −h1 tan γ2 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
hq−2/R hq−2 cot γ1 hq−2 cot γ2
. . . −hq−2 tan γq−1 0
hq−1/R hq−1 cot γ1 hq−1 cot γ2 · · · hq−1 cot γq−1 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 1

or (
Jhγ
)
ij
=
∂hi
∂γj
=

hi/R, j = 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1
δij, max(i, j) = q
0, 0 ≤ i < j − 1 < q − 2
−hi tan γj, 0 ≤ i = j − 1 ≤ q − 2
hi cot γj, 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ q − 1.
Now by
Mij ,
[(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ
]
ij
=
(
∂h
∂γi
)′(
∂h
∂γj
)
=
q∑
l=0
(
∂hl
∂γi
)(
∂hl
∂γj
)
, 0 ≤ i ≤ q
we can find {Mij} as follows (by symmetry it suffices to consider 0 ≤ j ≤
i ≤ q):
(i) i = j = 0:
M00 =
q−1∑
l=0
h2l
R2
=
1
R2
‖hq−10 ‖22 = 1.
(ii) j = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1:
Mij =
hi−1
R
(−hi−1 tan γi) +
q−1∑
l=i
hl
R
· hl cot γi
=
1
R
(−h2i−1 tan γi + ‖hq−1i ‖22 cot γi)
(a)
=
1
R
(−h2i−1 tan γi + h2i−1 tan2 γi cot γi) = 0
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where (a) follows from (A.27).
(iii) 1 ≤ j = i ≤ q − 1:
Mij =
q−1∑
l=i−1
(
∂hl
∂γi
)2
= h2i−1 tan
2 γi +
q−1∑
l=i
h2l cot
2 γi
(a)
= h2i−1 tan
2 γi + h
2
i−1 tan
2 γi cot
2 γi
(b)
= h2i−1 sec
2 γi = R
2
i−1∏
l=1
sin2 γk
where (a) follows from (A.27) and (b) follows from the Pythagorean
identity.
(iv) 1 ≤ j < i ≤ q − 1:
Mij =
q−1∑
l=i−1
(
∂hl
∂γi
)(
∂hl
∂γj
)
= (−hi−1 tan γi)(hi−1 cot γj) +
q−1∑
l=i
(hl cot γi)(hl cot γj)
= −h2i−1 tan γi cot γj + ‖hq−1i ‖22 cot γi cot γj
(a)
= −h2i−1 tan γi cot γj + h2i−1 tan2 γi cot γi cot γj
= h2i−1(− tan γi cot γj + tan γi cot γj) = 0
where (a) follows from (A.27).
(v) i = q, 0 ≤ j ≤ q: Mqj = δqj by inspection.
Therefore
M ,
(
Jhγ
)′
Jhγ = diag
(
1, R2, R2 sin2 γ1, R
2 sin2 γ1 sin
2 γ2, · · · , R2
q−2∏
l=1
sin2 γl, 1
)
.
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By (5.18) we have (all norms are Euclidean norm in the sequel)
Jφv =

v0/r v1/r · · · vq−2/r vq−1/r
−‖vq−11 ‖‖vq−10 ‖
v0v1
‖vq−11 ‖‖vq−10 ‖2
· · · v0vq−2‖vq−11 ‖‖vq−10 ‖2
v0vq−1
‖vq−11 ‖‖vq−10 ‖2
0 − ‖vq−12 ‖‖vq−11 ‖2
. . . v1vq−2‖vq−12 ‖‖vq−11 ‖2
v1vq−1
‖vq−12 ‖‖vq−11 ‖2
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 0 · · · − ‖v
q−1
q−1‖
‖vq−1q−2‖2
vq−2vq−1
‖vq−1q−1‖‖vq−1q−2‖2

or (
Jφv
)
ij
=
∂φi
∂vj
=

vj/r, i = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1
0, 0 ≤ j < i− 1 ≤ q − 2
− ‖vq−1i ‖‖vq−1i−1 ‖2 , 0 ≤ j = i− 1 ≤ q − 2
vi−1vj
‖vq−1i ‖‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ q − 1.
Now by
Nij ,
[
Jφv
(
Jφv
)′]
ij
=
(
∂φi
∂v
)(
∂φj
∂v
)′
=
q−1∑
l=0
(
∂φi
∂vl
)(
∂φj
∂vl
)
, 0 ≤ i ≤ q−1
we can find {Nij} as follows (by symmetry it suffices to consider 0 ≤ j ≤ i ≤
q − 1):
(i) i = j = 0:
N00 =
q−1∑
l=0
v2l
r2
=
1
r2
‖v‖22 = 1.
(ii) j = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1:
Nij =
vi−1
r
(
− ‖v
q−1
i ‖
‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
)
+
q−1∑
l=i
vl
r
· vi−1vl‖vq−1i ‖‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
=
vi−1
r‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
(
−‖vq−1i ‖+
‖vq−1i ‖2
‖vq−1i ‖
)
= 0.
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(iii) 1 ≤ j = i ≤ q − 1:
Nij =
q−1∑
l=i−1
(
∂φi
∂vl
)2
=
‖vq−1i ‖2
‖vq−1i−1 ‖4
+
q−1∑
l=i
v2i−1v
2
l
‖vq−1i ‖2‖vq−1i−1 ‖4
=
1
‖vq−1i−1 ‖4
(
‖vq−1i ‖2 +
v2i−1
‖vq−1i ‖2
· ‖vq−1i ‖2
)
= ‖vq−1i−1 ‖−2
(a)
= r−2
i−1∏
l=1
sin−2 φl
where (a) follows from (A.26).
(iv) 1 ≤ j < i ≤ q − 1:
Nij =
q−1∑
l=i−1
(
∂φi
∂vl
)(
∂φj
∂vl
)
=
(
− ‖v
q−1
i ‖
‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
)(
vj−1vi−1
‖vq−1j ‖‖vq−1j−1‖2
)
+
q−1∑
l=i
(
vi−1vl
‖vq−1i ‖‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
)(
vj−1vl
‖vq−1j ‖‖vq−1j−1‖2
)
=
vi−1vj−1
‖vq−1i−1 ‖2‖vq−1j ‖‖vq−1j−1‖2
(
−‖vq−1i ‖+
‖vq−1i ‖2
‖vq−1i ‖
)
= 0.
Therefore
N , Jφv
(
Jφv
)′
= diag
(
1, r−2, r−2 sin−2 φ1, r−2 sin−2 φ1 sin−2 φ2, · · · , r−2
q−2∏
l=1
sin−2 φl
)
.
Finally by
v˜i ,
(
Jφv v
)
i
=
q−1∑
l=0
∂φi
∂vl
vl, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1
we can find {v˜i} as follows:
(i) i = 0:
v˜0 =
q−1∑
l=0
vl
r
· vl = ‖v‖
r
= r.
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(ii) 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1:
v˜i =
(
− ‖v
q−1
i ‖
‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
)
· vi−1 +
q−1∑
l=i
vi−1vl
‖vq−1i ‖‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
· vl
=
vi−1
‖vq−1i−1 ‖2
(
−‖vq−1i ‖+
‖vq−1i ‖2
‖vq−1i ‖
)
= 0.
Therefore J
φ
v v = re0 and therefore
Jφv vv
′
(
Jφv
)′
= r2e0e
′
0 = diag(r
2, 0, · · · , 0).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR MULTIPLE ACCESS
CHANNELS
Lemma B.1. Let An,Bn ∈ R3×3 be two sequences of positive semi-definite
symmetric matrices satisfying ‖An −Bn‖1 = O
(
1
n
)
. Then
λmin(An) ≥ λmin(Bn)−O
(
1
n
)
.
Proof. Let An = Bn + ∆n and let un be the unit vector corresponding to
λmin(An). Then
λmin(An) = u
′
nAnun = u
′
nBnun + u
′
n∆nun
≥ λmin(Bn)− λmax(∆n) = λmin(Bn)−O
(
1
n
)
.
Theorem B.2. [44, Theorem 1.1 with dimension d = 3] Let S1, . . . ,Sn be
independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) random vectors in
R3 with ESi = 0 for all i. Let S =
∑n
i=1 Si. Assume M = Cov(S) > 0 and
let X ∼ N (0,M). Let
β =
n∑
i=1
βi, where βi , E[‖M−1/2Si‖32]
and let
∆(S) = sup
A∈S
|Pr{S ∈ A} − Pr{X ∈ A}|
where S is the class of all convex subsets of R3. Then there exists c > 0
independent n such that ∆(S) ≤ cβ.
Lemma B.3. For fixed positive definite matrix Σ ∈ Rd,  ∈ (0, 1), and
δn = o(1), we have
Qinv(Σ, + δn) = Qinv(Σ, ) +O(δn) (B.1)
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Proof. Let X ∼ N (0,Σ). Then for fixed x ∈ Rd the mapping δ −→
Pr {X ≤ x + δ1} is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing. There-
fore we have
Pr {X ≤ x + δn1} = Pr(X ≤ x) +O(δn)
and by the definition (6.6) of Qinv we have (B.1).
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